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Summary findings
Pakistan's rural sector accounts for more than 70 percent  priority program may be needed to get credit to women,
of employment, and roughly two-thirds of rural  smallholders (with 10 acres or less), and the rural
employment is in agriculture. Less than a third of rural  nonfarm sector (small-scale nonfarm activities such as
households get loans, only 10 percent of which are from  livestock, fishery, forestry, and rangelands, and industrial
institutional sources. Pakistan's credit institutions are not  microenterprises).
helping the country accelerate agricultural growth and  Subsidizing interest rates is not the way to help
reduce poverty.  marginal borrowers. Instead, they can be helped through
To improve performance in the rural economy and  fixed-cost subsidies and self-selected targeting.
efficiency in financial institutions, rural credit markets  Nongovernmental  organizations (NGOs) should be
must be liberalized. The government needs to initiate the  encouraged to help, keeping in mind such NGO success
following reforms:  stories as the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh and Badan
* Produce and price controls must be replaced by  Kredit Kecaratan (BKK)  in Indonesia.
prudent regulation and supervision, combined with  Commercial banks should be encouraged to lend on
policies to stabilize the economy.  other bases than the mortgage and passbook system.
* Commercial banks must operate  in a competitive  They could experiment with wholesaling credit through
environment. They must be allowed to set interest rates  input suppliers, marketing agents, and NGOs. They
for rural lending that cover their transaction costs.  should consider lending for such downstream
* Credit must be made available to support  agricultural activities as agroprocessing.
productivity growth for agricultural smallholders and  The biggest challenge facing rural finance is the
small producers of the rural nonfarm sector, where  restructuring  of cooperatives. The next important step
Pakistan's growth potential lies.  for the Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan
* Credit must be made available to women and to the  would be a portfolio audit - the results of which will
rural poor  for consumption-smoothing  and for  determine next steps, such as major restructuring of its
sustainable income-generating activities.  portfolio and changing its ownership. To improve rural
Policy should be directed at developing a market-based  financing, the system of property rights, title, and default
financial system for rural finance, but because of market  enforcement must also be strengthened, among other
failures to support disadvantaged groups, a special-  reforms.
This paper  - a product  of the Agricultural  and Natural Resources  Division,  South Asia,  Country Department  I-is  part of a larger
effort in the region to analyze mnajor  issues of agricultural growth and rural development in Pakistan and working with the
government  in developing a strategy  to address  those issues.  Copies  of the paper are available  free from the World Bank, 1818
H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433. Please  contact Clydina  Anbiah, room T7-020, telephone 202-458-1275, fax 202-522-
1778, Internet address canbiah@worldbank.org.  April 1996. (56 pages)
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A. Summary
The rural sector in Pakistan accounts  for more than 70 percent of total employment,  and about
two-thirds  of rural employment  is in agriculture. A healthy and well-functioning  rural finance system  can
help in achieving two policy objectives:  accelerating agricultural growth and reducing poverty.  In
Pakistan  today, however,  existing  credit  institutions  are not helping  to attain these objectives.  Investment
in agriculture  is low, and productivity  growth in agriculture  therefore  is stagnant.
A picture of rural finance is available  from the 1985 credit survey and other previous  surveys.
According to these surveys, many households  have been credit constrained,  and no credit institutions
target the poor. Less  than one-third  of rural households  have obtained  loans, and only 10 percent of these
borrow  from institutional  sources. Among informal  sources,  family and friends dominate,  and landlords
and moneylenders  account for a small and declining  portion.  Because  average loan size from formnal
sources  is much larger than that from informal  sources,  formal sector credit accounts  for a larger portion
of agricultural debt than its share of households. Although  the informal sector share is declining, it
remains  high in comparison  with other Asian  countries.
Virtually  all institutional  credit is for production  and investment  purposes,  whereas  about half of
informal  credit is for consumption.  Both the formal  and informal  sectors  disburse  mostly  short-term  loans
(78 percent  and 96 percent,  respectively),  but more  than half of formal sector  loans are long term in value
terms.
The informal sector has a far superior  record in loan repayment, and most recovery  are made
from regular sources  of income.  Distress sales are uncommon. Most formal loans are  land mortgages,
whereas  virtually all informal  loans are backed  by a personal  guarantee. Informal  sector  interest rates are
higher and more  vanable than formal rates. The informal  sector relies  on its own funds, while the formal
sector is funded  predominantly  by the State Bank of Pakistan (for the Agricultural  Development  Bank of
Pakistan and the cooperatives)  and by deposits (in the case of the commercial  banks).  Formal sector
loans go mostly  to large farmers, despite targets for small-farm  lending. These targets are easily  evaded
by proxy  loans and one-man  cooperatives.-fi-
According  to the 1990  IFPRI survey,  credit accounts  for a greater proportion  of the expenditure
of poor households. Interest rates on informal loans from sources other than friends or relatives are
particularly  high. Since informal  loans are predominantly  for consumption,  it is not clear that these loans
help recipients  escape  poverty.
The importance  of credit availability  can be seen by the fact that mean input expenditures  per
hectare are significantly  higher for farmers with credit, regardless  of their level of assets. Higher input
expenditures  are presumably  associated  with  higher productivity  growth.
The demand  for credit in rural areas arises  from agricultural  investment,  consumption  smoothing
by households,  and nonfarm investment. These components  are reflected  in the demand for credit to the
extent that these requirements  cannot be financed  from farm savings.  Farm savings consists of self-
financed investments,  bank deposits,  and cash holdings.  The savings rate in 1983 - 93 was almost 8
percent, which represents  an increase over the savings rate in the 1970s. The increase can be traced to
higher incomes,  remittances  from abroad,  and rising land  values.
Agricultural  investment  averages  around  7 percent  of agricultural  valued added or gross domestic
product  (GDP) and it is estimated  that an additional  one percent agricultural  growth is associated  with
investment  of 2 percent  of agricultural  GDP.  With these  parameters,  the annual institutional  credit need
for agriculture (production  and investment  credit) under the present growth scenario (4 percent annual
growth rate) will be about Rs. 15.4 billion annually, which is about the same amount delivered by
institutional  sources  in recent  years. Thus, on aggregate,  credit does not appear to be a constraint  and the
situation seems to have improved over earlier years (in the 1973 and  1985 rural credit surveys, the
estimated  gap between  credit availability  and need was estimated  at 7 to 1 and 3 to 1  respectively).
But the credit situation faces several serious  problems. First, as discussed  next, the existing
institutions  delivering formal credit are facing  a serious  financial crisis and cannot  be sustained. Second,
as discussed  earlier,  the present  rural finance system  does  not cover adequately  the smallholders,  who will
be very  important  for future growth. Third, an increase  in the growth rate of agriculture  will increase  the
demand  for credit.  It is estimated  that a  1 percent increase in agricultural  output will create a demand
for credit of 0.6 percent of agricultural  GDP, assuming  that farmers continue  to self-finance  and borrow
from non-institutional  sources at their previous rate (which would make the total investment up to 2
percent of agricultural GDP associated  with a one percent additional  growth of agricultral  GDP). But
while more rapid growth  in agriculture  raises the demand  for credit,  it will also raise incomes  and thus the- iii  -
ability to self-finance. Even with this increase in own resources,  the total demand is expected  to be
greater.  Furthermore, capital-intensive strategies to  enhance  agricultural productivity will  create
additional  demand  for credit.
Additional  sources  of demand  for credit are production  credit requirements  of nonfarm business
and of livestock  activity  and consumption  credit requirements  of the poor. Rural women's need for credit
are also presently not met.  The present rural finance system  is inadequate  for  these needs and will be
more so in the future unless  major  policy  reforms  (as outlined  later) are undertaken.
Rural Credit  Sources
The Agricultural  Development  Bank of Palistan (ADBP) was designed to provide supervised
credit for smallholders,  with the goal of doorstep credit provision  coupled with technical guidance.  It
provides short-, medium-, and  long-term loans.  Long-term loans can (in principle) be  given for
nonagricultural  purposes.  Acceptable  collateral  is reasonably  broad (movable  and immovable  property,
guarantees,  assets, and crop hypothecation). The ADBP has concentrated  on long-term lending, which
has financed purchases of tractors and tubewelis. Loans go  mainly to medium and  large holders.
Marginal farmers and  the landless are almost completely excluded from ADBP lending.  Lending
procedures  are dominated  by the passbook  system, and few smallholders  are able to obtain passbooks.
Loan evaluation (if it takes place at all) is based on technical factors rather than financial viability.
Among the ADBP's serious  weaknesses  are illiquidity (foreign  benefactors  have withdrawn  funding and
there  is  no  deposit base), abysmal loan  recovery rates, high  administrative expenses, because of
overstaffing,  and subsidy  dependence.
Commercial  bank involvement  in the rural sector is a relatively  recent  phenomenon,  dating  from
government  behest in the early 1970s.  Targets were set for lending to smallholders,  and small farm
lending was further encouraged  by an interest-free  loan scheme  that operated  through most of the 1980s.
The scheme  was greatly  abused, however,  and since its abolition commercial  bank lending to agriculture
has declined.  To combat  abuses  each union council  was assigned  a designated  bank to make loans in that
area, reducing  financial intermediation  services. Although  the banks now account  for about one-quarter
of fonnal sector credit to agriculture, lending to agriculture  represents  less than 5 percent of their loan
portfolio  since  agricultural  lending  carries a high cost  for the banks.-iv -
The major  success  of the commercial  banks  has been their ability  to mobilize  deposits  in the rural
sector.  As much as 30 percent of their deposits may come from rural areas, facilitated  by a growing
number  of rural branches.
The cooperative  sector is perhaps  the most disappointing  sector  in terms of rural credit  provision.
Cooperatives  arose as an alternative to rural moneylenders,  and this early focus on credit provision  has
remained. Credit  was provided  to cooperatives  by the cooperative  banks, but many spurious  cooperatives
have  been  formed  with the sole purpose  of obtaining  credit. The government  has tried to broaden  the role
of cooperatives  to organize  the distribution  of inputs and marketing of outputs (their traditional roles in
other countries),  but these attempts have met with little success. The Federal Bank for Cooperatives,  at
the apex of the system lends (via the Provincial Cooperative  Banks) predominantly for short-term
purposes. Recovery  rates have varied  by region.  Although  they are good in Punjab  and Northern  Areas
(about 90%  of the rescheduled  loans),  they are poor elsewhere.
The fundamental problem facing the cooperative  movement is a lack of its autonomy.  The
cooperatives have been usurped for  political purposes.  The collapse of the  Cooperative Finance
Corporation, with Rs. 15  billion in rural deposits,  has not helped matters. Particularly  egregious  abuses
occurred during the interest-free loan period, when it was estimated that 61 percent of cooperative
societies  formed purely for the purpose of obtaining  cheap loans.  Loan evaluation  and monitoring has
been nonexistent.
The cooperative  movement  has disappointing  coverage  of the rural sector, primarily  because  of
the requirement  that members  must own immovable  property,  which immediately  excludes  the 34 percent
of farmers  who are tenants. Two-thirds  of  villages have  no cooperative  society.
The lending structure  of the cooperative  movement  leaves  much to be desired. Provincial  banks
function as cashiers and have no role in loan evaluation or loan recovery. Portfolio management is
cxtremely  poor, and the Federal  Bank for Cooperatives  does not mobilize  its own resources,  relying  on the
State  Bank of Pakistan  for its funds.
The informal  sector has  been more  creative  in its lending practices. One popular structure  is the
Rotating Savings  and Credit  Association  (ROSCA). ROSCAs  are groups  whose members  each contribute
a small,  fixed amount  each month to a pool, which  is loaned  to one group  member. Eventually,  eachmember  will be able to borrow from his or her group's pool. ROSCAs appear to be more common  in
urban areas.
Perhaps one-fifth  of rural credit is supplied  by marketing  intermediaries. Rural enterprises  in
particular are often forced to  rely on this  type of credit, given the banks'  preference for  making
agricultural production loans.  Interest rates can be extremely high.  Finance provided as part of a
sharecropping  arrangement  is a declining  component  of informal  finance,  as are moneylenders.
Credit and the Poor
While poverty  in Pakistan has declined,  the concentration  of the poor in rural areas is high and
may have increased  in the 1980s. Important sources  of income  for the poor are livestock,  crop income,
and nonfarm microenterpnse  income. Directed  credit programs  for the poor have not performed  well
because  of targeting failures and high transaction costs. Agricultural  growth alone can help the poor by
creating  job opportunities,  but a group  of destitute  poor in rural Pakistan  will require  targeted assistance.
Certain programs have had particular success  in credit delivery  to the poor, especially  the Aga
Khan Rural Support Project (AKRSP).  The program's three complementary  components-economic,
social, and technical-concentrate  on incentives,  organization,  and skills at the village level. The program
has an excellent  repayment  rate on loans.  It is not clear, however,  whether the AKRSP  has raised net
credit provision  in the areas in which it operates  or has simply displaced  other sources. The program
benefits  from its small scale,  and its skilled  staff would  be severely  strained if the program was expanded.
The AKRSP  most likely would  have to be integrated  with other credit institutions  if the program were
broadened.  Other NGO programs have also had  some success, notably the  Sindh Rural Worker
Cooperative  Organization and the Family Planning Association  of Pakistan.  A recently instituted self-
employment  credit scheme  also  has shown  signs  of success.
Bangladesh's Grameen  Bank has some important lessons  for NGO lending in Pakistan.  The
bank is able to target the rural poor through self-selection  mechanisms,  notably  by making it compulsory
for its borrowers  to attend meetings (which have a high opportunity  cost for richer farmers ) and by
offering  only small loans.  Credit is only one  component  of Grameen  Bank 's activities. The bank has
done an excellent  job in mobilizing  rural savings, although loans still exceed the deposit base by a
significant amount.  Group-based  lending and decentralization are the cornerstone of  its  success.
Lending  remains  a high-cost  activity  for the bank, however, and its interest rates would  have to rise in the
absence  of any subsidy.-vi-
B.  Polivy  Recommendations:
The rural credit market must operate efficiently  in order to facilitate better performance  of the
rural economy  and help promote  economic  growth. To allow  financial  institutions  to work  efficiently,  the
rural  credit markets must be liberalized.  The government itself should not manage the financial
institutions nor should it set interest rates.  However,  product and price controls must be replaced by
prudent regulation and supervision.  The strategy is to foster a liberalized rural financial market with
strengthened role of the  State Bank of Pakistan in  prudential regulation as  well  as institutional
development  (with  the help of NGOs)  for providing  rural credit services.
In particular,  the government  needs  to initiate  the following  reforms  of rural credit policies:
*  Current  policies  will have to be replaced  by prudent regulation  and supeLvision  accompanied  by
strong  macroeconomic  stabilization  policies.
- A competitive  environment  must be set for commercial  banks who then must be allowed  to set
interest rates for rural lending  to cover  their transaction  costs.
*Credit  must be made available to support productivity  growth in smallholder  agriculture and
small producers of the rural  nonfarm sector, since they are the sources of future growth in
Pakistan.
*  Credit also must be made available to the rural poor and to the women, for consumption
smoothing  and for  sustainable  income-generating  activities.
Particular attention  will have to be focused on credit provision to smallholders  (those with 10
acres or less), the rural nonfarm sector, and women. Transaction  costs of lending to these groups are
extremely high because  loans are typically small and risks are high. A commercial  banking sector
therefore  may not be willing to undertake such lending  Commercial  banks mnay  also be unwilling to
finance long-term projects  or those with little financial  payoff.  Interest rate subsidies  are not the way to
help marginal borrowers.  Instead, they can be helped through fixed-cost subsidies and self-selected
targeting.
NGOs should  be encouraged  in this area, keeping  in mind the lessons  of NGO success  stories in
Pakistan and elsewhere  (particularly  Grameen  Bank in Bangladesh  and Badan  Kredit Kecaratan  (BKK)  in- Vii  -
Indonesia).  Key criteria that must be applied to any policy intervention  in lending are adequate loan
recovery  rates, market interest rates, and mobilization  of deposits.  Another key feature common to
successful  financial services  models  is the lowering  of trnaction  costs for both borrowers  and lenders,
often by establishing  joint liability groups to reduce risks and transaction costs.  Such programs may
provide  the greatest  scope  for policy  action  for donors  and the Government.
Commercial  banks are able to mobilize  resources  to rural areas but, as noted earlier, are not
oriented in or wiling to take the risk of agricultural  or rural lending. Commercial  and large farmers may
be able to borrow  from commercial  banks once government  interference  and interest rate regulations  are
removed. However,  institution  development  for certain  disadvantaged  groups  may appear  prudent  because
of market  failures. Thus, while policy  should generally  be aimed  toward  a market-based  financial system
for rural finance, a focused priority program for rural finance for smallholders,  small-scale  non-farm
activities and micro-enterprises  could be undertaken without jeopardizing either the growth or  the
efficiency  of the financial  system.
Prioritizing  certain rural activities  might be necessary  for a number  of reasons. First, the long-
term potential  gains from certain economic  activities  do not translate into short-term  gains for the actors
Second,  some activities  for example,  physical  and social  infrastructure  have substantial  economic  benefits
but are not commercial  in nature.  Third, the urban-industrial  background  of the financial institutions,
with their heritage of asset-based  rather than project-based  lending, predisposes  them to an orientation
that may not be effective  for certain groups of rural producers.  Finally, in a free market economy
industrial and financial interests tend to coalesce,  marginalizing  nontraditional,  smaller, and nonurban
borrowers.
The three priority sectors for targeting are the smallholders  with 10 acres or less; nonfarm
activities  in the agriculture  sector of a noncommercial  nature (for example, livestock,  fishery, forestry,
range lands);  and microenterprises  in the industrial  sector.  These three sectors  deserve  special  attention  in
the  interest of poverty reduction, broad-based and balanced development,  slowdown of rural-urban
migration,  and meaningful  linkages  between  the rural economy  and the urban economy.
Certain  institutional  changes  are required. Commercial  banks should  be encouraged  to lend on a
basis other than mortgage and the passbook system.  They may also experiment with the idea of
wholesaling  credit through input suppliers  and marketing  agents as well as through NGOs.  The banks
should  also consider  lending  for downstream  agricultural  activities  such as agroprocessing.  The system  of
property  rights, title, and default  enforcement  also needs  to be strengthened.-vin  -
The restucturing  of the co-operafives  is the biggest chaUlenge  facing rural  fince.  The
restructuring must be based on  pooling resources through savings, financial viability (through the
formation  of larger  groups), group-based  responsibility  for loan repayment,  extension  of co-op  actvities to
the  nonfarm sector, self-selective  membership mechanisms, and proper monitoring and  control of
membership  criteria and member  activities.
The next important  step for the Agricultural  Development  Bank of Pakistan (ADBP) would  be a
portfolio  audit. Based on the results of this audit, the next steps will have to be worked out These steps
may include drastic actions (such as liquidation) or major restucturing  of its  portfolio (such as
transferring  bad loans to a colUection  agency)  along with  changing ADBP's  ownership  by selling  its shares
to the private sector.  The share of the  government  could be reduced over time with the private
shareholders  increasing  their role in the management. The new ADBP,  worldng  under SBP regulations
and supervision,  will be able to diversify  the portfolio  between  farm and non-farm  activities.
A new bank can be developed  to service  smallholders,  small non-farm  borrowers,  and especially
women,  who are left out of the formal financial  and cooperative  systems,  based on lessons learned from
Grameen  Bank about the success  of group-based  lending where formal markets fail.  Such a bank can
succeed  in Pakistan  if organized  and run by an independent  management  with government  support.
The government of Pakistan may also create a  'Poverty Alleviation and  Small Farmers'
Development  Fund" which may provide subsidized  funds to the above mentioned specialized  bank for
smalUholders  but also to NGOs, commercial  banks and cooperative  banks who will provide financial
service  to the poor, the small holders,  and women. The objectives  of these subsidized  funds, provided  for
only  limited  periods of time, would  be to develop  institutions  to provide  credit to the targeted  group.  The
ultimate  borrower,  however,  will pay market  interest rate.1
Chapter 1. Introduction
The availability  of adequate  rural credit is central to an improved  economic  climate  for economic  growth
and poverty  alleviation  in Pakistan. In 1995, 88 million of Pakistan's estimated 128 million people (69  percent)
resided  in rural areas. Of the 34 million employed  Pakistanis, 24 million (71 percent) have rural jobs'.  Women's
employment  opportunities  are also greater  in rural areas. Women  constitute  6 percent of the total rural labor  force
compared to 2.4 percent of the urban work force.  Rural employment does not simply mean agricultural
employment. In fact, only 64 percent of rural employment  is in agriculture; 12 percent is in services and the
remaining 24 percent is distributed,  more or less equally, in manufacturing,  construction,  and trade. The rural
financial  system  must respond  adequately  to the demands  of each of these  components.
The most  important  objective  for  rural  finance  must  continue  to  facilitate  farmers'  access  to inputs  and improved
technology,  and thereby  accelerate  agricultural  productivity  growth. Pakistan's  past agricultural  performance  has been
quite  good. The sector  has grown  by more  than 3 percent  a year  for  the past  thirty  years. However,  the country  is now  in
a phase  in which  future  growth  will be sustained  only  by high productivity  grwth.  On this  measure  of performance,
Pakistan's  agricultural  sector  has lagged  behind In terms  of productvity  measured  by output  per unit of a single crop,
growth  has been  much  lower  than that  in comparable  countries  such  as India  and Egypt For example,  in the past  decade,
wheat  yields in the Indian  Punjab  increased  2.9 percent  per annum,  and yields  in all developing  conries  were  up 2.7
percent  per annum. In Pakistan,  by contrast, the increase  was only 1.6  percent There is large  yield  variation  among
different  types  of farmers  in Paklstan. For wheat  and rice,  the yield  gap  between  "progressive"  farmers  and others  is 30
percent  and 50 percent,  respectively.  Furthermore,  recent  studies  show  that  total  factor  productivity  (which  compares  an
index  of all outputs  with  an index  of all inputs)  in Pakistan  has stagnated  or even  declined  in the post-Green  Revolution
period.
The factors  that determine  agriculture  productivity  growth  include  soil  quality,  availability  of irrigation,  prices
for outpus, access  to inputs,  information  on new  technologies  and markets,  the incentive  sucture  embedded  in the land
tenure  system,  farmers'  educational  levels,  and rural  infrastructure.  Agricultural  credit  has the crucial  role  of facilitating
access  to inputs,  particularly  those  enibodied  in new,  high-yielding  technologies.  When  credit  is easily  available,  farmers
switch  quickly  to new technologies  and achieve  rapid  productivity  growth. But a number  of feaures may  affect  farmers'
access  to credit,  such as small  farm size and tenancy  arrangements  that result in poor collateral. When  this happens,
aggregate  productvity  growth  is retarded  because,  as in Paktitan,  poor  access  to credit  results  in a large  yield  gap  between
the "progressive"  (typically  medium-sized)  farmers  and  the laggards  (typically  small  owner  cultivators  and tenants). An
' The numbers  given in this paragraph  are taken  from: Pakistan  Economic  Survey,  1994-95. Women's  labor  force
participation  data are based on the 1987-88  Rural Labor  Force Survey. The rural employment  breaakdown  is taken
from the 1992  Labor  Force Survey.2
impmved  financal market  would  lower  the risk  of lending  to smalUholders  and improve  their access  to new inputs,  and
would  therefore  contnbute  to  productivity  growth.  2
The  rural  financial  system in  Pakistan,  furthermore, has  to  address  the  special needs  of  the
disproportionately  large number  of poor households  located  in rural areas. Policy-directed  lending to the poor is
justified because  of the market's failure to correctly  assess  the risk in lending to the poor and to manage that risk.
The poor may not be able to satisfy  the  collateral  requirements  grounded  in individual  property rights.  On the
other hand, policy-directed  credit based on group lending spreads risk and appeals to social responsibility  for
contract enforcement.  This results in better management of risk and renders the poor more creditworthy.
Furthermore, lending  to the poor is also an important  equity  objective  both because  reduction  in income inequality
per se is often a social goal and because poverty reduction  contributes  to political stability  and thus facilitates
growth.
According  to the 1987-88  household  income and expenditure  survey, 85.8 percent of the country's total
population  in poverty  live in rural areas. This is consistent  with a more recent  finding that household  income in
rural areas is 35 percent lower  than income in urban areas. The poor are found among small cultivators  (owner-
cultivators on marginal lands and tenants), landless agricultural  workers, small livestock  owners, and nonfarm
workers. Rural finance directed at these households  must be affordable  and sustainable  and, more importantly,
must reach the truly needy. However,  the development  of rural credit market in Pakistan has been "considerably
distorted" (Mellor, 1995). The result is a fragmented  credit market that varies in development  and density  by
region, as examined  by Malik (Credit Use. Poverty and Role of Institutional  Rural Credit: the Case of Pakistan.
3iPRI, 1993.)
In addition  to farmers  and the rural poor, there is a large community  of non-farm  rural households
engaged  in microenterprises.  Their credit  needs  for income  generating  activities  are substantial  and are currently
not being met satisfactorily.  Given  this sector's  contribution  to overall  economic  growth  and employment
generation,  it is important  that credit  be made  available.
This paper argues that a properly designed rural finance system  in Pakistan must have the following
objectives:
2 It has been argued  that when market  imperfections  exist,  lenders  face the problem  of managing  the risk of loan
default  (J.D. Von Pischke,  Finance  at the Frontier  Debt Canacity  and the Role  of Credit  in the Private  Economy.
The World  Bank, 1992). Some  view credit  as a process  of intermediation  rather  than as a production  input and
argue for improving  this process  through  the market  mechanism  (Dale  Adams,  D. Graham and J.D. Von Pischke,
Undermining  Rural Devedopment  with Cheap Credit. Westview,  1984). However,  neither  financial  intermediation
nor higher interest rates  will resolve  the problems  of asymmetric  information  and imperfect  enforcement  that
prevail  in developing  countries  (Karla  Hoff  and J. Stiglitz,  "Introduction:  Imperfect  Information  and Rural Credit
Market  - Puzzles  and Policy  Perspectives". The World  Bank Economic  Review:  4(3) 1990.3
*  Access  to credit  should  not be hampered  by policy  or mariet failures  to resict  productvty growth  in agriwuum
Wben  small  farmers  constite  the bulk of the farming  community,  as they do in Pakistan,  insbbtitons  need  to be
created  that  overcome  market  failure  due  to the high  risk  and high  tasaction  costs  assoated with lending  to such
farr.
*  Credit  should  be  vailable  to the nual poor for consumption  smoothing  as well as to promote  sustainable  inme
genration activities.
*  Policy intervtions  that create special  lending  institutions  to meet the first two objectives  shotld be s$ect  to
conditions  that ensure  financial  suviability  by reduing and ultimately  eliminating  their depene  on subsidy.
The conditions  are adequate  recovey  of loans,  market  interest  rates,  and mobilization  of deposits
*  When  scarce  credit  is targeted  at special  groups  of fanrers or the rural  poor,  transparent  criteria  must  be establshed
to  continuously  evaluate  targeting  performance.
*  Credit  must  be made  available  for  non-agricultumal  rual  activities  such  as micro-enterprises  in  ural  manufauriD&
The paper  is stuctured as follows.  The  rest of this chapter  presents  a profile  of Pakistan's  nual crdit  Chapte
2 evaluates  the credit  need  of farmers  and the performane and lending  practices  of the formal  and infomal sources  Of
rural credit  Chapter  3 presents  a profile  of rural  poverty  in Pakistan  and reviews  the credit  componns of the  pecial
programs  for employment  generation,  income  support and poverty  alleviation.  Finaly, chapter  4 estimates  the curret
need  for mral  credit  by major  categories  of rural households  and then recommends  oost-ctive  policies  for delivering
credit  to these  groups.
Ie  Rural  Credit Profile
A detailed  profile  of the rural  financal market,  based  on nrual  credit  surves, helps  to pinpoint  its sgths  and
weaknesses.  The last comprehensive  rural credit  survey  was undertakn in 1985. Other  assessments  based  on smalr
amples  have  broadly  corroborated  the conclusions  of the 1985 survey.  The most  recent  of these  is the srvey carried  out
by the International  Food  Policy  Research  Institute  (IFPRI)  with USAID  funding. IFPRI  conducted  several  rounds
of  interviews  of rural households  in selected  districts to elicit information  on rural consumption,  production,  and
employment  patterns.  Although  the sample was not randomly  drawn and the coverage  was relatively  small, the
survey  findings  provide  many useful  insights into the rural credit  market  in Pakistan. 3
Six  policy-relevant  dimensions  of  the credit  profile  are discussed  in this chapter.  These  are (a)  the imporlance  of
mral credit  to agricultunal  pefon  anc,  (b) the wverage  of fanners  by the rural credit  system,  (c) dffelrences  between
institutional  and noninstitutional  credit  sources  with  respect  to (d) oDsts  and (e) objectives,  (f)  the differnces in acs  to
3This  discussion  is adapted from Joachim  von  Braun, Sohail  Mahlik,  and Manfred  Zeller (1993),  Credit  M
Input Support  Policies  and the Poor:  Insights  from Africa  And Asia.4
credit  soumes  by rich and  poor  households,  and  finally  (g)  the lending pratices of different  sources  that affect  household
access.
Credit  is Imortant For Inaeasing  Productivity  in Agriculture
The importane of farm credit  to agricultural  productvity  growth  is well established  in many countnes.  Two
recent  studies in Pakistan corroborate  these results.  Sohail  Malik, Mohammed  Mushtaq  and Manzoor  Gill ("The
Role of Institutional  Credit in the Agricultural  Development  of Pakistan",  Pakistan Development  Review Winter
1991)  estimate  the relationship  between  the log of farm output and the log of institutional  credit using household
level data in the 1985 Rural Credit Survey.  They estimate a  coefficient  value of  0.15 which is statistically
significant at 99 percent level of confidence.  Earlier, Habib Zubeiri ("Production  Function, Institutional  Credit
and Agricultural  Development  in Pakistan", Pakistan Development  Review  Spring, 1989)  using more aggregate
data, had not found a statistically  significant  correlation  between  farm output and institutional  credit.  However,
the  relationship  between  credit and purchase of inputs such as seeds and fertilizer was found to be statistically
significant.  These inputs,  in tur,  are significantly  correlated  with productivity  growth.
The rural  credit survey carried out by  IFPRI also provides  direct evidence  on the differences  in input
expenditure  among  farmers  with  and without  access  to rural  credit  Table 1.1  below  shows that  all  farmers  (regardless
of asset  size)  who  have  access  to nual credit spend  more  on farm  inputs  compared  to farmers  who do not have  access  to
credit On average,  input  expenditure  by farmers  with  access  to credit  is 37 percent  higher  than  those  without  access.
Table  1.1. Inut  ExDenditures  for  Households  with  and without  Access  to Credit  by Asset  Quintiles
(USS  per hectare)
Ass  et  Qutile
Household  Type  Lowest  Second  Third  Fourth  Highest  Overall
.......................  . ..............................  ............................................................................................................................  . .............................  .........................................  ................
Without  credit  48.17  45.10  48.02  55.12  67.62  53.30
(5.51)  (3.65)  (3.13)  (3.64)  (4.57)  (1.80)
Withcredit  59.08  66.34  61.36  81.33  112.69  72.84
(3.05)  (8.23)  (6.19)  (8.69)  (13.76)  (3.45)
T-test  -1.72**  -2.70*  -2.12*  -3.29*  -3.76*  -45.43*
No. of houslds  216  219  218  216  211  1,080
Notes.  Dollar  expenditures  per hetae  are computed  using  $1 = Rs. 21.28
Figures  in parenthesis  are standard  errors  of respective  means
*  and ** indicate  that  the difference  of means  is staistically  significant  at the 5%  and 10%  level,  respectively.
Source:  IEPRI,  Pakistan  Panel Survey,  Round  13, 1990  cited  in Von  Braun,  MaUik4  and  Zeller  (1993)5
Rural  Credit  Reaches  Few  Rural  Households
Despite  the imnportance  of credit  in increasing  agncultual productivity,  few  rural households  are able  to obtain
credit.  A stiking finding  of the rural credit  survey  is that institutional  sources  (the Agicultural  Development  Bank,
commercial  banks,  and cooperatives)  provide  credit  to only  a small  proportion  of rural households. The 1985  survey
reports  that there were 9.24 million  rural households  in Pakistan,  of which 5.18 million  were &rming  households  and
4.05 million  were  nonfarm  households.  Only  32 percent  of the housel.olds  (2.95  million)  reported  taking  loans,  and 27
percent  reported  outstanding  debt.  Of households  that borrow,  a mere 10 percent  (240,000 households)  borrow  from
institutional  sources  (ADBP,  76 percent;  commercial  banks, 17 percent; and  cooperative  societies;  6 percent). The
remaining  borrow  from noninstitutional  informal  sources  (friends  and relatives,  67  percent; landlords,  11 percent;
factories,  2 percent;  and money-lenders,  2 percent). The total  outstanding  debt  of all farn households  at the time  of the
survey  was Rs. 25,076  million. Thirty-two  percent  of this amount  was owed  to formal  institutions  and the rest to the
informal  sector.  The average  debt  per household  owed  to institutional  sources  was Rs. 32, 955 -- nearly  4.5 times  more
than  the average  debt  of Rs. 7,390  from noninstitutional  sources. Comparison  with  selected  Asian  countries  by Mellor  in
Some  Issues  in Istitutional Finance  for  Agricultural  Development:  International  Evidence  and Implications  for  Pakistan,
PIDE, 1995 shows  that the percentage  of borrowings  of  farm household  from institutional  sources  were higher for
Philippines,  Thailand and India than  for  Pakistan.
Noninstitutional  Credit  is Expensive  vet  Remains  the Predominant  Mode  of  Rural  Finance
While  the share  of noninstitutional  credit  declined  in recent  years  from  89 percent  of  total  rural  credit  in 1973  to
62 percent  in 1990,  it remains the predominant  mode  of rural  finance  (table  1.2  ).  This  pattern  is similar  to that  of many
other  Asian  countries  (see  table 1.3  ).
The IFPRI survey  shows  that the cost of credit  varies significantly  depending  on the credit source (Table
1.4). The average interest rate charged by formal sources  in 1990 was 12.8 percent. The average interest rate
charged  by friends  and relatives,  at 14.3 percent,  was only slightly  higher, but the rate charged  by informal  sources
was as high as 33 percent. Although  the rate  varies across  different  sources,  there is little variation  in the rate paid
by rich and poor borrowers. Thus, it appears  that the neither the formal nor the informal sources  vary their rate
according  to the assets  owned  by borrowers;  instead,  the assessment  of risk is on other  criteria.6
Table 1.2. Institutional and Noninsitutional Sources  of Credit
(percentage  of tota faim credit)
Year  institutional Sources  Noninstitutional  Sources
1973  11  89
1985  27  73
1990  38  62
Sbuuce: Rural Credit Survey 1973, 1985; Agrculturn  Census, 1990.
Table 1.3. Itrnational  Comparison  of the Share of Infoml  Rural Credit
Informal credit share  Reporting year
(percentage)
Philippines  71  1978
India  70  1972
Bangladesh  63  1974
Pakistan'  73  1985
Maaysia  62  1986
Thailand  52  1985
Indonesia  52  1985
South Korea  50  1981
.............................................................................................................................
Pakistan data are from the 1985  rual  credit survey.  The Agricultural  Census 1990 reports infonral credit at 62 per cent
Saurc:  P.B. Ghate, AsianDevelowmentReview  (1988)  Vol. 6: 64-85.7
Table 1.4.  Mean Interest  Rates on Positive  Interest  Rate Loans  and the Proportion  of Loans  with Non-zero  Rate
to Total Loans (1990)
Loans  from  Loans  from  Loans  from
Institutional  Sources  Friends  and  Noninstitutional  Other
relatives  Informal  sources
Mean  Share  of  Mean  Share of  Mean  Sare  of  Mean  Share  of
interd  total  intend  total  interest  total  Intren  totl
Ant  QuinC  Rate  loam  rate  han  Rate  loam  Rate  l0MM
Lowest  11.1  66.7  10.0  0.5  30.0  0.2  10.7  0.5
Secod  11.5  53.8  20.0  0.4  24.8  1.0  13.9  1.8
Third  11.9  73.9  0.0  0.0  IS.0  0.3  12.0  3.1
Fourth  12.6  73.1  0.0  0.0  57.2  0.7  13.0  7.8
Highed  12.9  81.9  0.0  0.0  31.3  1.5  13.1  19.1
All Groups  12.8  76.8  14.3  0.2  32.9  0.7  13.0  5.7
Source: IFPRL  Pakistan  Panel  Survey,  Round  13,  1990,  cited  in Von  Braun,  Malik and  Zeller  (1993).
Institutional  and Noninstitutional  Credit  Sourcs Serve  Different  Needs
Most (94 percent)  of institutional  credit  is for agricultural  production  and investment  (Table  1.5). Nearly  half
(47 percent) of noninstitutional  credit is for consumption. The requirement  fcr nonfarm busminess  credit remains
unsisfied, according  to the 1985  rural credit srvey.  Projecting  their future credit  requirements,  borrowers  estimated
that their credit requirement  for farm actMties  vwxld  constitute  56 percent  of total need; their requirement  for diret
consumption,  24 percent;  and  their requirement  for credit  to finance  nonfarm  business  imvestments,  20 perent
Table  1.5.  histitutional  and  Noninstitutional  Borrowing  by Purpose.  1985
(percentage  of  total  borrowing)
...............................  .................................................................  .................................  ..............................  ..........................
Source  Farm  Agriculture  Business  Industry  Consump-
Nonfarm  tion
..........................................................................................................................  .......................................................................................................................  .......................
In~fli~nn1  9  4  2  ...................  ..  .... 94.  3
(Rs  7,472  million)
39  3  10  .. 47
N o n in stitu t  039  3T  R  ....................................... 1...........................  ........................................................  4 (.Ru.  20 519  million)
Sotuce:  1985  Rutal Credit  Survey.
Note: The  figures  do not add  up to 100  because  of  rounding8
The duration  of credit  from diffierent  sources reported  in the 1985  survey  is presented  in Table 1.6.  Both
institutional  and noninstitutional  credit sources  lend primail  to short-term  bonowers  The table also  shows  that only
institutional  sources  do significant  medium-  and  long-term  lending.
Table 1.6:  Distnrbution  of Loans by Term (oercentage)
. Category  Short  term  Medium  term  Long  term
By number  of borrowers
Institutional  78  10  11
Noninstitutional  96  4
By  loan  amount
Institutional  32  16  52
Noninstitutional  90  9
Source:  Rural Credit  Survey,  1985.
Richer  Rural  Households  Have Better  Access  to Cheaper  Institutional  Credit  Whereas  Poorer  Households  DPend Mainly
on Expensive  Noninstitutional  Sources
The IFPRI  survey substantiates  that credit is important  to all rural households. Fifty-seven  percent of the
surveyed  households  use credit, which  finances 17 percent  of household  expenditure  on farm inputs, farm capital,
and consumption. Not surprisingly,  there is an inverse cofrelation  between household wealth and credit use
(Table 1.7). This table shows the shares of various types of expenditure  financed through borrowing  by the five
asset quintiles.  Thirty-three  percent of the expenditures  of poor households  are financed through credits compared
with 11 percent for richer households. This pattern is observed  regardless of whether credit is used for the
purchase of inputs or capital assets or to finance consumption. Poor households  rely mainly on informal, more
expensive,  credit sources  (Table  1.8). Only 1 percent  of their total credit is from formal sources,  compared  with 98
percent  from friends and relatives and other informal  sources. Richer households,  by contrast,  obtain  most of their
credit (58 percent)  from formal sources.
Rich farmers'  superior  access  to institutional  sources  is also  corroborated  by the 1985  rural credit  survey.  It
shows  that within  the crop  sector,  the major  part of credit  is preempted  by large  farmers. About  60 percent  of small  and
subsistence  farmers  do not borow at all.  Of those  who  borrow,  90 percent  have recourse  only  to the infonnal  market
Because  of the enormous  expansion  in availability  since  1973,  there has been  some improvement  in the smaUlholders'
access  to  institutional  credit The  evidence  is distorted,  however,  due  to the abuses  associated  with  interest-free  loans  from
1979  to 1988. These  loans were generally  preempted  by large farmers,  who either  used the names of smallholders  to
obtain  loans  or understated  the size  of their  own  holdings.9
Table 1.7 Proportion  of Expenditure  Met Through  Credit  by Asset  Quintiles  and Use of Credit
Proportion  of
Credit-Using
Proportion of Expenditure Met by Credit (°/.)  Households  to
Asset quintile  Input  Capital  Cons. Inc Food  Total  Total Households
Lowest  47.65  37.33  31.86  32.89  58.67
(39.89)  (4.53)  (54.96)  (100.00)
Second  30.90  65.21  30.09  27.88  54.19
(22.75)  (26. .65)  (50.59)  (100.00)
Third  17.16  44.90  24.37  21.05  58.25
(13.86)  (27.53)  (53.98)  (95.37)
Fourth  12.56  10.56  21.17  12.65  58.80
(18.37)  (13.33)  (68.30)  (100.00)
Highest  17.61  14.30  14.88  10.74  55.52
(37.41)  (23.39)  (39.20)  (100.00)
All households  22.15  23.34  22.70  17.02  57.05(g)
(27.67)  (19.78)  (51.57)  (100.00)
Note:  Figures in parentheses  are percentage  shares  of credit  used for each category  out of the total credit.
(a) This sample  of households  differs  from the households  covered  in the 1985  Rural Credit  Survey.
Somrce: IFPRJT,  Pakistan  Panel Survey,  Round 13,  1990,  cited  in Von  Braun,  Maik and  Zeller  (1993).
Table 1.8 Source  of Loans  by Asset  Quintile
Institutional  Noninstitutional
Percentage  of  No. of  % Credit  from  No. of  % Credit  from  No. of
Credit  from  Loans  Friends  and  Loans  other informal  Loans
Asset Quintiles  Formal Sources  Relatives  Sources
........  ..................................................................................................  ....  ...................................................................................................................
Lowest  1.05  3  31.43  201  67.51  585
Second  4.83  13  49.53  249  45.63  396
Third  12.60  23  48.33  244  39.07  308
Fourth  29.62  52  35.44  174  34.95  285
Highest  58.36  116  20.10  139  21.54  263
AR households  32.16  207  32.39  1007  35.45  1837
SoM  : IFPR1  Pakistan  Panel Survey,  Round 13,  1990,  cited  in Von  Braun>  Malik,  and  Zeller  (1993).10
Poor  Hsolds'  Access  to Institutional  Fince  is Coainaed  by Complex  Procedure  and Nontan  cv
Table  1.9 compares  the princpal lending  prcices  of institutional  and noninstitutional  sources  of credit  It is
clear that noninstitutional  sorces have  much  simpler,  more  flexible  procdus  than institutional  sourc.  For example,
as much  as 76 perent of institutional  credit  was against  the swcurity  of landed  property  and 21 percent  against  personal
suety.  In contrast,  96 percent  of the borrowing  in the noninsitutional  market  was on personal  sixty, 2 percent  was
backd by  land,  and 1  percent  by agncultural  produce.  Institutional  credit  has  not  been  weaned  away  from  land mortgge
despite  of the best  efforts  of policymakers  and success  stones  from  other  systems  operating  on personal  or group  guarantee
(such as Grameen  Bank in Banglidesh).  The infonnal market  advanced  Rs. 19.7 billion on personal  surety,  while
institutions  advanced  only  Rs. 1.7 billion.  Financial  accommodation  on this count by the informal  market  was eleven
times  the coverage  by the institutional  credit  system.
This  bnef  review  of the rual  credit  profile  suggests  the following:
*  Even  though  rural credit  is very  important  for productvity  growth,  rural households  have  inadequate  access  to the
financa market;  more  than two-thirds  of  the households  do not  or can not  borrow
*  Rural financal intermediation  is thi  Institutional  credit covers  only 36 percent of  the mral credit market
institutional  sources  do not mobilize  large savings  in rural areas,  and noninstitutional,  informal  sources  generally
geneate their  own  funds  for on-lending.
*  Large  farmers  preempt  the major  part of crop  credit particularly  from  institutional  sources.
*  Smallholders  are dependent  mainly  on the more  expensive  noninstitutional  market,  which  offers  small  loan  amounts
and  caters  mainly  to their  consumption  and  other  short-term  needs.
*  Complex  procedues and lack of transparency  make it difficult  for poorer  households  to borrow  from institutional
sources  of credit
*  Credit  is mainly  for agnculture  and within  agriculture,  primarily  for the crop  sector,  very  little  credit  is provided  for
liveock, fishery, and  forestry.  Hardly  any formal  credit  reaches  small  business  enterprises  in nrual  areas,  which  has
retrded diversification  of  the  rual economy  and prevented  rural employment  generation  sufficient  to discourage
rural-uban  migration.
*  Istitutional  credit  is currently  not  being  directed  toward ural  poverty  alleviation.11
Table 1.9  A Comarsn  of Institutional  and  oninti  l Credit  Makts  (19885):
Institutional  Maret  Noninstitutional  Market
.............................................................................................................................................................................................................................
Number  ofborrowers  400,000  2 million
Total  credit  Rs 18  billion  Rs 33.4 billion
Principal  players  ADBP  (55%)  Friends  & relatives  (58%)
Commercial  banks  (29.4%)
Cooperaives  (15%)  Marketing  intermediaries  (16%)
Landlords  (8.1%)
Money  lenders  (2.4%)
Factories  etc.(4.8%)
Average  interest  rate  (1973)  Mean 8.16  (3/6);  SD 1.82  Mean  15.43  (%/6);  SD11.63
Source  of  funds  ADBP:  SBP  &  foreign  sources  (87%)  Mainly  own  funds







Equity  & eained earnings  (40/%)
Collateal  requirement  Stingent  with  complex  procedures  None
Flenbility  Regulated  terms  Very  flexible  terms
Subsidy  ADBP  subsidy  at 32%  None
Loan  recovery  Below  50  percent  Excellent
Cost  of credit  delivery  9.1  percent  for ADBP  Negligible  transaction  costs
Source: 1985  Rural Credit  Survey
Finally,  a word on the financial  viability  of Pakistan's  rural  credit  market. The viability  of a financial  system  is
reflected  in repayment  of outstanding  credit At the time of the 1985 survey,  82 percent of the credit was due for
repayment  but only  38 percent  bad been  paid off. Noninstitutional  sources,  with  repayments  at 61 percent,  fared  better.
That repayments  can be improved  through  tighter  supervision  can be seen in the evidence  that most repayments  (87
percent)  are made  from regular  sources  cf income  and not through  distress  sales. This  means  that if properly  supevised,
borrowers  can  manage to pay.  Distress sales of property acoDunt  for  only 8  percent of total  repayments.12
Chapter  2.  Rural  Credit  Requirement  and  Credit  Delivery
The demand  for rural credit stems  from agricultural  production  (investment  and production  credit), consumption
smoothing  especially  by poor households  (consumption  credit) and  investment  needs of rural households  engaged
in livestock  rearing and microenterprises. This demand  is then met by institutional  and non-institutional  sources.
This chapter  estimates,  in part A, the annual agricultural  credit requirement  of farmers  from institutional  sources,
and then discusses  how this is met. The delivery  of credit by the non-institutional  sources is discussed  in Part B.
The credit requirement  of  poor households  (for consumption  smoothing  as well as for agricultural  production),
rural women  and households  engaged  in microenterprises  are discussed  in Chapter  3.
A:  Institutional  Credit
Demand  for Institutional  Credit  and Credit  Availability
Investment  Credit
The requirement for institutional credit for agriculture is calculated as the difference  between credit
needed  to support  a given level of agricultural  growth  and other available  sources  of financing. Although  it would
be desirable  to distinguish  between  farners' own savings  and informal  sources  of credit, data do not permit such a
distinction. However,  the important  differences  between  informal  and formal sources  will be pointed  out based on
the findings  of various rural credit surveys.
The demand  for agricultural  investment  credit 4 is associated  with growth in agricultural GDP. Between
1979/80  and 1993/94  agricultural  GDP grew at a steady 3.6 percent per year. The ratio of annual investment  to
GDP  in the agricultural  sector averaged  6.8 percent in 1979  - 88, and to 6.9 percent in 1988 - 93.
Using these figures, it is calculated  that 1 percent agricultural  growth in recent years has been associated
with agricultural investment  of about 2 percent of agricultural  GDP.  This investment demand was met partly
through  farmers' own savings  and partly by borrowing  from institutional  sources.  (Informal  sources  of credit lend
only small amounts for investment purposes.) The analysis of savings presented in the Appendix shows that
60 to 70 percent  of farm investments  are financed  by farmers  through their own savings.
4 Given  the price (interest  rate) demand  for credit is determined  by rate of return from the use of credit.
Requirements,  in contrast,  are estimated  by indirect  methods  such as from the gap between  total  finance needed  for
optimal  use of inputs and funds available  from our resources13
Box  2.1. Alternative  Approaches  For Estimating  Farm Credit  Requirement
The State Bank of Pakistan uses  a direct  approach  to estimate  the need  for credit in agriculture
(Report  on Preparation  of Estimates  of Agricultural  Credit  Requirements,  State  Bank of Pakistan, 1989  edition).
The methodology  for this direct approach  was devised  in 1973-74. For estimating  short term loans, the procedure
involves  a detailed  bre3kdown  of crops  sown and the key inputs  used for those  crops. Assumptions  are then made
regarding  the proportion  of inputs  that the fanner purchases. These  estimates  are revised  periodically. Revisions
were carried  out in 1978-79  and in 1983. In 1987  again a committee  was constituted  to revise the estimates  based
on farm surveys  carried  out by the Punjab  Economic  Research  Institute  (PERI). For example,  the 1987  committee
revised  up the estimates  of percentwge  of acreage  for which  seed  is purchased  for nine crops. Similarly  revisions
were  also made for electricity  charges,  for cost  of tractor hire and for pesticides. For long term loans, similar
revisions-are  carried  out for key investments  such as land and water course  improvement,  tubewells,  open
wells/Persian  wheels,  threshers  and other  farm machinery. In order to capture differences  in credit  needed  across
farm size,  periodic  adjustments  are also  made for the weights  of small,  medium  and large farms in total farmed
acreage.
How well does the indirect  approach  of this report approximate  the direct approach  of by the State
Bank in its credit allocation  decisions?  This report  argues  that growing  at the trend rate of 4 percent,  the projected
1992-93  agricultural  GDP  of Rs. 350  billion would  be associated  with a credit requirement  (from  institutional
sources)  of Rs. 15.5  billion. The actual credit disbursed  by institutional  sources  was Rs. 15.4  billion.  Thus the two
approaches  yield almost identical  estimates. However,  note  that this is for the projected  agricultural  GDP.
Because  of monsoon  flooding,  the actual 1992-93  agricultural  GDP was estimated  at a considerably  lower Rs.
297.8  billion,  Thus the actual credit  allocation  was considerably  higher  than that required  by actual GDP. But this
is ex-post. What  matters is the ex-ante  estimate  and for that the two  approaches  give  very similar  results.
Another  comparison  between  the two  approaches  may  be made  on the basis of total credit
requirement  of the farm sector. Using the direct method,  the State  Bank estimates  the 1995/96  farm credit
requirement  for investment  (medium  and long term requirement)  at Rs. 29.3 billion  or 6.8 percent of the projected
agricultural  GDP(estimated  at Rs. 453  billion if agriculture  grows  by 4 percent  over its 1994/95  value). This
report's  indirect  method  estimates  the requirement  for investment  credit at a somewhat  higher 8 percent. The big
difference  in the two approaches  is for production  or short term credit. The State  Bank method estimates  it at
nearly  twice  the investment  credit  while this report,  following  evidence  from other  countries,  estimates  it at half
the investment  credit  requirement.
However,  the demand  for credit may  be higher given that some  borrowers  may shift  to institutional
sources  if credit is available  at rates lower  than prevalent  rates in the informal  market. Although  no such recent
estimates  are available,  the rates  in the informal  market  are generally  higher than what is charged  by institutional
sources. But one could argue that if credit is available  to borrowers  at a reasonable  rate of interest, though  not
subsidized,  the amount  of credit demanded  from institutional  sources  is bound  to increase  as the rate of interest
will be lower  than the rate charged  in the informal  market. Such  empirical  issues  can be resolved  through  further
studies  of the informal  credit market.14
Given  these  parameters,  several  alternative  scenarios  may  be constructed  to estimate  the demand  for formal
agncultural  credit  The scenarios  are driven  by assumptions regarding  agricultural  growth  rates, the propensity
for informal  financing  of investment,  and the capital-output  ratio in agriculture. The results  are presented  in
Tables 2.1 and 2.2. Table  2.1 assumes  that 1 percent  growth  requires a ratio of investment  to agricultural  GDP  of 2
percent,  whereas  Table 2.4 assumes  a ratio of 3 percent The first column in each table gives  three assumed
agricultural growth rates.  The next three columns  estimate  the needed  credit for investment  assuming  investment
is financed  through informal  sources  (farmer's  own savings  plus borrowing  from informal  sources)  at rates of 5, 6
and 7 percentage  points. The nine estimated  values  in the three columns  are the needed  agricultural  investments
as a percentage  of agricultural  GDP,  assuming  different  combinations  of agricultural  growth  and rates of credit  for
informnlly  financed  investment. Thus, in Table.  2.1 (which  assumes  capital  output ratio of 2:1), 4 percent growth
in agriculture  requires  total investment  of 8 percent  of the agricultural  GDP. If non-institutional  sources  (own
savings  and  borrowings  from informal  sources)  provide  5 percentage  points of these, the requirement  for
institutional  credit is calculated  to be 3 percentage  points.
Table 2.1. Annual Credit  Requirement  from Institutional  Sources  for Aaricultural  Investment
(Percentage  of 1992-93  Axricultumal  GDP)
(Assuming  1 percent growth  requires  investment/Ag.  GDP  rate 2 percent)
Agricultural  growth  rate  Assumed  percentage  points of investment  financed  through non-formal  sources
5  6  7 .........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................
4  3  2  1
6  7  6  5
8  11  10  9
Source: Authors' estimates
The needed investment  credit can be calculated  in (1994-95) rupee values by multiplying the by the projected
1995-96  agricultural  GDP  of Rs. 449.1  billion (assuming  that the agriculture  will grow  at 4% per annum between
1994-95  and 1995-96). This yields total  investment  credit need  from institutional  sources  of Rs. 13.47  billion.
Production  Credit
According to the 1990 agricultural  census of Pakistan, investment on inputs such as fertilizers and
insecticides  constituted  about 10 percent of total annual investment  in agriculture. This underestimates  the share
of prodution  expenditures  to total investment  because  seeds, purchase of water, and hiring of implements;  and
labor are not, included.  The evidence  from other countries  in the region suggests  that total expenditure  on inputs15
constitutes  about half the investment expenditures. For simplicity,  it is assumed that farmers self-finance  (or
borrow  from informal  sources)  65 percent of the required  production  credit need. Production  credit required  from
institutional sources may now be calculated as half of the required investment credit or  1.5 percent of the
agricultural  GDP. For projected  1995-96  agricultural GDP of Rs. 449.1 billion, this is calculated  to be Rs.  6.74
billion.
Total  needed  from institutional  sources  for 1995-96  is a simple  addition of the estimated  investment
and production  credit need of Rs. 20.21  billion.
How robust  are these estimates  of required  institutional  credit? One way to check this is to compare  the
estimates  with the actual lending done by the institutional  sources  in the recent past (see also Box 2.1). Table 2.2
and 2.3 and the accompanying  figure show the annual agricultural growth rate an the associated disbursed
institutions  agricultural credit as a share of agricultural  GDP between 1989-90  and  1994-95.  Ignoring 1992-93
when agricultural  GDP feel sharply due to monsoon  flooding, the average annual growth rate of agriculture  was
5.05 percent and average annual disbursed  credit as a percentage  of agricultural  GDP was 5.54. The recent actual
experience  shows  that 1 percent agricultural  GDP  growth is associated  with institutional  credit to agricultural  GDP
rate of 1.12 percent. This report estimates (Table 2.1) that 4 percent growth rate would require institutional
credit/agricultural  GDP rate of 3 percent (under the assumption  that 5 percentage  points of investment  is financed
through  non-formal  sources).  The two  estimates  are close.
Table 2.2 Institutional  Credit  Disbursement  (Rs. million)
ADBP  Toccavi  Cooperatives  Commercial  TOTAL
Banks
1980/81  1,0066.6  8.6  1,128.3  1,816.1  4,019.6
1989/90  9,389.9  35.6  815.1  3,629.5  13,890.1
1990/91  8,323.9  56.3  3,017.5  3,517.6  14,914.8
1991/92  6,996.4  56.3  3,247.0  4,179.6  14,479.3
1992/93  8,643.4  50.8  2,978.0  4,526.5  16,198.1
1993/94  8,989.3  ---  2,621.5  4,063.3  15,647.1
1994/95  8,293.9  - 2,076.3  2,849.18  13,849.4
Source:  State  Bank of Pakistan16
Table 2.3 Agricultural  Growth  & Institutional  Lending  (Percentage)
Agricultural  GDP Growth  Insitutional Credit/  Agricultural  GDP
..........................................................  ........................  ..................  ..  ...............................................................................................  .........................  ..........  ........  ._  _.  _.  ...
1989/90  3.03  7.0
1990/91  4.96  6.4
1991/92  9.5  5.1
1992/93  -5.29  5.4
1993/94  2.86  4.4
1994/95  9.49  5.1
average  excluding  1992/93  5.05  5.6
Source:  Government  of Pakistan:  Economic  Surveys  and State  Bank of Pakistan
Agricultural  Growth  and Institutional  Lending
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If the agriculture  growth  target is set at a much higher rate of 8 percent  (the upper  bound  growth
scenario),  more capital-intensive  technology  will be required,  pushing  the mvestment/GDP  rate  to 3 percent (Table
2.4). Assuming  that the proportion  of self-financed  investment  changes  modestly  (about  two  percentage  points of
the needed  credit)  the investment  credit  required  from institutional  sources  would  be 17 percent  of agricultural
GDP (Table  2.4). Total credit  needed  from institutional  sources  thus would  depend  on various  factors  and could
valy between  3 to 17 percent  of agricultural  GDP  under alternative  assumptions.17
Table 2.4. Annual Credit  Reaqirement  for Agricultural  Investment  (Percentage  of 1992-93  Agricultural  GDP)
........................  r...1e  qur es inves  tm.  .............. G.............ent.A...GDPr  t..e.  ..  ........  ....
Agricultural  growth  rate  Assumed  percentage  points  of investment  financed  through non-formal  sources
5  6  7
4  7  6  5
6  13  12  11
8  19  18  17 Source:..........  A  uthors'...........  estim  ates..........  .....................................................................................................................................................................
An important  finding of this report is that at least in the 1989-90  to 1994-95  period,  farmers  have not
been credit constrained.  the sector  has grown  at a healthy  annual average  rate of 5.1 percent (ignoring  the
abnormal  year, 1992-93)  supported  by institutional  disbursed  credit  of 5.6 percent of the agricultural  GDP,  which
is close to the required  rate to support  growth.  Yet the 1985  surey, based  on farmers' direct response  to questions,
estimates  the gap between  credit need  and availability  at 3:  1. Although  a considerable  improvement  over  the 1973
survey,  which reported  the gap at 7:  1, it is considerably  larger  than that reported  in Table 2.4. There  may be
several  explanations.  First, farmers may  want to shift credit  demand  from the more  expensive  non-institutional
sources  to the cheaper  institutional  ones. Second,  farmer estimates  of credit  need may  be based on best farmer
practices.  Yet another explanation  is that smallholders  with poorer  access  to credit  from formal sources  may indeed
be credit constrained.
The critical  policy  issues  thus are: (i) continuing  to make credit  available  at current  levels  (or higher
levels  if a faster rate of growth  is desired)  while ensuring  the financial  survivability  of the lending  institutions;
(ii) ensuring  that credit reaches  the smallholders  as well so that they can emulate  the best practice  fanners; and
(iii) providing  for the credit needs  of non-fann  business  enterprises,  women  in rural areas, households  engaged  in
livestock  business  and the rural poor.  The next section  and chapter M review  the existing  practice  and institutional
arrangements  concerning  these issues  and then chapter IV outlines  the policy  interventions  to achieve  these policy
objectives.18
Credit Delivery  Practices of Institutional Sources
Agricultural  Development  Bank.  The Agricultural  Development  Bank of Pakistan was established in 1961 by
merging  the Agricultural  Development  Finance Corporation  (1952) and the Agricultural  Bank of Pakistan (1957).
The ADBP's  charter is to modernize  Pakistan's agriculture  and promote  the growth of the cotton  industry  in rural
areas.
The ADBP's sources  of funds are:
*  State Bank of Pakistan,
*  Multinational credit  agencies  (the  World Bank,  International Development Association,
International  Fund for Agricultural  Development,  and the Asian  Development  Bank).
*  Bilateral  sources,  particularly  the OECF  of Japan
*  Mobilization  of deposits
The ADBP's principal sources  of funds are the State Bank of Pakistan and the aid-giving agencies.  The
fist  credit was given to the ADBP by the World Bank in 1965/66.  The executive  head of the ADBP is its
chairman,  who is assisted  by executive  directors. The bank has seventeen  divisions  and fifty-one  regional offices
and 334  branch offices.
The bank provides short-term, medium-term  and long-term loans. Short-term loans (six to eighteen
months) are primarily  for the purchase of agricultural  inputs. Loans  for poultry farming are also given  through
this window.  Medium-term  loans (eighteen  months to five years )  are given to purchase tractors and pumping
sets, and for sheep and goat farming, dairy farming, beekeeping,  and sericulture. Long-tenn loans (five to ten
years) are for the purchase of tubewells  and agricultural  machinery such as tractors, harvesters, sprinklers, and
drilling equipment.  Long-term loans are also given for nonagricultural activities such as poultry farming,
warehousing,  forestry,  orchards,  tea plantation,  and fisheries.
The collateral  for ADBP loans include immovable  property,  installed machinery,  land leased  for ninety-
nine years, movable  property (for example,  fann machinery),  bank guarantees,  government  guarantees,  insurance
policies,  saving certificates,  and crop hypothecation.  Personal guarantees  are also accepted.  The rate of interest is
13.5 percent  for general credit  and 17  percent for project  credit.
The majority  (56 percent  ) of ADBP's  lending is long  term, which  has contributed  to the mechanization  of
agriculture.  The bank's long-term  loans have  helped  purchase  303,889  tractors and 83,171 tubewells  at costs of Rs.
5.3 billion and Rs. 3.7 billion, respectively. During 1992/93,  the bank advanced  Rs. 4,797 million as long-term19
credit  (compared  to commercial  bank lending of only  Rs.  356 million). In 1993/94  ADBP's long-term  lending
rose to Rs.  5,019  million.  The current lending level covers  about 17,000  tractors and 2,400  tubewells. In fact, the
fortunes of the local tractor industry are shaped  by ADBP lending policies. The emphasis on tractor loans is so
prominent that the bank uses the number of non-tractor loans as a  measure of diversification,  which actually
dropped  from 64 percent to 53 percent  during 1989-94.
The ADBP pioneered supervised  credit in Pakistan. The scheme, designed mainly for  smallholders,
combines the provision of credit with extension work giving technical guidance and  advice on  disciplined
repayment. The main  delivery agents are  Mobile Credit Officers, young agricultural graduates with rural
background  who provide a link between  the bank and its farmer clients. Each Mobile Credit Officer  is assigned
fifteen  to twenty  villages.  There are 1,450  Mobile  Credit  Officers,  and most villages  are covered  by this program.
ADBP's principal target market consists  of the 679,000  small and medium  farmers owning less than 25
acres, who account  for 90 percent  of the farming  community  and 64 percent of the total cultivated  area. The ADBP
disburses  loans to 100,000  borrowers  each year. In any given community,  the ADBP serves  only 17 percent of the
famer's  more  than 60 percent of its loans arc given to medium-size  farmers  owning  more  than 12.5  acres.
ADBP's  experience  with targeting credit to smallholders  and landless tenants (maximum  of two hectares
of irrigated and four hectares of rainfed land) has been very limited and coverage  has been modest. One reason
may be the emphasis  on the passbook  system,  which  is used in the case of 83 percent of all lending,  compared  with
21 percent for the nationalized commercial  banks. Very few marginal farmers have been able to get passbooks
because of bureaucraaic  problems. Recently,  Kissan Bank windows were started for smallholders.  But in the
absence  of procedural  changes,  the target of 60 percent lending  to this group  may not be achieved.
The bank has also started to provide  credit to women.  For this purpose  thirty-four  female Mobile Credit
Officers and twenty-seven  female Village Assistants  have been inducted.  Lending for microenterprises  has also
started.
Despite  the promising  design  of the ADBP  and its many innovative  schemes,  it has not performed  well as
a viable  financial  institution. A  review  commissioned  by the World  Bank in August 1993  identified  the following
weaknesses:
*  Liuidity.  In 1990/93  the ADBP  benefited  from several cash inflows  that propped up its liquidity.  The State
Bank of Pakistan (SBP) lent Rs. 8.5 billion and subscribed for Rs. 1.2 billion in  shares. Foreign debt
administered  by the SBP led to a net cash inflow of Rs. 2.9 billion. More recently, however,  the ADBP's20
benefactors  have started to pull back. Three of the foreign agencies providing funds to the ADBP have
suspended drawdowns. The SBP has increased pressure to  improve deposit mobilization. Despite these
pressures,  the ADBP's deposit-taking  decreased in recent years.  This implies that the ADBP will have to
improve  loan recoveries  to sustain  disbursements.
*  Loan  Recoveries  . The ADBP's loan recovery  rate deteriorated  from 55 percent in the year 1990  to below 50
percent in 1993,  despite  a campaign  to improve  recovery  led by the ADBP chairman.  Loan  recovery  in Punjab
is 67 percent,  but it is an abysmally  low 27 percent in Baluchistan.  Extensive  rescheduling  takes place, which
distorts recovery  rates and erodes  security  cover. Given  little likelihood  of improving  recovery  rates, a policy  of
more aggressive  write-offs needs to be pursued  to improve  recovery.  The principal problem  of repayment of
loans under general credit is slow payment due to over elaborate procedures and documentation.  Because
interest is not charged on past dues, profitability  of the portfolio  is eroded.  Project loans, which comprise 15
percent of the total loans outstanding,  were meant to encourage  agribusinesses  but are financial  failures. This
has resulted  in a ban on project  lending since 1992.
The analysis of ADBP's project  loans portfolio  shows  a dismal picture.  As of April 1993,  42 percent of the
loans amounting to Rs. 2.9 billion, were classified  as 'sick" or had been referred to the Banking Tribunal.
Recoveries  from those loans before reschedulement  fell from 19.8  percent in 1991 to 14.6 percent in 1992 and
continue  to fall.
Personnel and  Administration. Portfolio performance is affected by the quality of administration and  staff
employed  by the ADBP.  Instead  of upgrading  staff quality,  the bank has continued  to increase  the number  of staff.
The result is a deterioration  in portfolio  performance  despite  the increase  in administrative  expenses.  In the period
1989-92, the ADBP expanded its loan book by 31 percent and increased its branch network by 20 percent.
However,  while the net margin in this period  increased  by 25 percent, administrative  expenses  increased  by a hefty
56 percent. The bank has also suffered  from a high turnover of senior management.  Since 1988, the Bank has
seen  through 8 chairmen  with an average  tenure  of less  than a year each.
The additional  administrative  expenses  have  been absorbed  by the head office  where staffing  increased  by
16 percent in 1989-92.  The ratio of salaries to total expenses  increased  by 68 percent in 1989-92  (3 percentage
points higher than the ratio in commercial  banks). The real challenge is to reverse  the staffing  situation  so that an
increasing number of employees  are involved in income generation and loan recovery.  ADBP management
acknowledges  that 'the large-scale  promotions  made in the past few years without reference  to the vacancies  or
actual requirements  and without minimum  qualifications  of graduation  for officers  have deteriorated  operational
efficiency  in the bank."21
An  important  lesson from  international  experience  is that  standard  financial  ratios  (such as  return  on
equity and return on assets) are not reliable indicators of the economic soundness of agricultural credit institutions
because of the endemic subsidies (such as replenishment of equity, cheap loans, and rediscounts from the central
bank) that  prop up these ratios. Thus  institutions  can continue  to enjoy a  good public image  even though their
sustainability is in serious doubt.  To evaluate the true health of a financial institution, a subsidy dependency index
(SDI) is used. The SDI  shows by how much the current interest rate on agricultural  loans would have to increase
to truly cover the cost of lending, assuming all incoming funds and  services were  charged market rates.5 Several
financial  intermediaries  were reassessed using the SDI. Thailand's  BAAC performed the best, showing an  SDI of
26 percent  in  1988 (a 26 percent  incrcase in the on-lending  rate from  11.9 percent  to  15 percent would permit
BAAC to become self-financing) . The Jamaican Agricultural Credit Bank is the other extreme.  Even though the
bank  looked very hLalthy on conventional financial  criteria, the  SDI index  had  a value of  312 percent  in  1991
(nominal  interest  rates  of  10 percent  would  have  to  be  raised  to  41.2  percent  for  the  institution's  financial
viability).
The SDI for the ADBP was 31.4 percent in 1988 (table 2.5).  It fell to 25.5 percent in 1990 and then increased
to 36.2 percent in 1992.  It feDl  in 1990 because  ADBP raised Rs.  5.6 billion on the interbank market, which reduced the
amount borrowed at a subsidized rate. The interbank borrowing  was partly repaid in 1991 and fuly repaid by June 1992
through increased borrowing at a concessionary  rate from the SBP. This increased the SDI in 1992.  The implication of
this movement in SDI is that the interest rate that the ADBP should have charged on its lending to eliminate the subsidy
was 15.5 percent in 1988 and 16.6  percent in 1992,  compared with the actual rates of 11.8 percent and 12.2 percent that
the ADBP  charged.
Table 2.5.  ADBP Subsidy  Dependency  Index (in percentage)
1988  1989  1990  1991  1992
SDI  31.4  29.6  25.5  31.6  36.2
Rate charged onloans  11.8  11.9  11.9  12.5  12.2
Rate needed to eliminate subsidies  15.5  15.4  14.9  16.5  16.6
Source:  Authors'  estimates
5 See J. Yaron (1992), Assessing Development Finance Institutions:  A Public Interest Analysis. World Bank
Discussion Paper 174.22
The net profit of the bank declined  from  Rs.  301 million in fiscal 1989  to Rs.  193  million in fiscal 1994.
As a proportion  of total assets, the decline  in profitability  is more  marked  - from 9.3  percent to 0.5 percent.
Historically,  the ADBP has been used as an instrument  for distributing  agricultural  subsidies  rather than
as a financial institution that operates  in accordance  with sound commercial  guidelines.  Staffed  princi,ally by
agriculturists,  the bank assesses  development  projects  on technical  and engineering  grounds rather than evaluating
their economic and financial viability.  As a  result, loan recovery  has declined and bad or doubtful debt has
increased.  Given a low deposit base, the bank is increasingly  dependent on subsidies  from the State Bank of
Pakistan.  With the state bank gradually cutting back on concessionary  lending, the ADBP's financial  viability
appears  bleak.
Commercial  Banks.  Commercial  bank lending in rural areas is a  recent phenomenon in Pakistan. Prior to
independence  in 1947,  there were two sources  of institutional  credit for rural areas: 'taccavi"  loans advanced  by
the government  to provide .elief  in times of calamity and distress, and cooperative  credit.  Both institutions
catered  mainly  to agricultural  credit needs. After independence  commercial  bank activity picked  up momentum  in
the urban areas first. Their involvement in agriculture was largely confined to  the financing of marketing
operations,  with commodity  stocks  as collateral. Natural hazards, volatility  of production,  the high cost of lending
to  sniallholders,  and the difficulties  of collateral  inhibited loaning for agriculture. The first significant change
came in 1972,  with the promulgation  of the Banking Reforms  Act, which assigned  the SBP  the role of increasing
the flow of credit to the agricultural  sector. The SBP  set targets for lending to agriculture,  imposed penalties  for
default, and ensured  a 50 percent subsidy  on losses  on  such lending. An Agricultural  Credit Advisory  Committee
was set up to work out farmer credit requirements,  based on the cost of inputs, estimates  of farmers' savings,  and
availability  of credit from the informal  market. The system  of personal  surety as collateral  was introduced  as was
the use of passbooks  as authentic  evidence  of landholding. The Agriculture  Produce  Rules, promulgated  in 1973,
stipulated  that 70 percent of institutional  lending should  be for smallholders  with holdings of 12.5 acres or less, 20
percent  for farmers  with holdit  gs between  12.5  and 50 acres,  and 10 percent  for large farmers.
The Banking  Reforms Act spurred  agricultural  lending  by commercial  banks, which reached Rs.  13,81.2
million by 1978, a quantum  jump of sixteen times the starting level of Rs.  85.7 million. The second  phase of
agricultural lending by commercial  banks began in  1979/80 with the introduction of interest free loans for
smallholders. Under pressure of demand,  disbursements  gathered great momentum. The peak level reached in
1986/87  was eighty-five  times the starting level of 1972/73. But this lending was abused, and the government
abolished  the scheme  in June 1988,  promising  to establish  a Grameen  Bank-type  of institution  for the rural poor.23
The result was a sharp decline in commercial  bank lending, which fell to Rs.  3,052.0 million in 1988/89 and
stabilized  at Rs. 4,063.3 million  in recent  years.
The commercial  banks currently disburse  26 percent of the institutional  credit for agriculture, compared
with 57 percent by ADBP and 17 percent by cooperatives. However, as a proportion of their total portfolio,
agricultural  lending is only  4.9 percent. In June 1994  total outstanding  advances  were Rs.  303,623  million,  while
advances outstanding against agriculture were Rs. 14,810 million (State Bank of Pakistan  Annual Report,
1993/94).
Commercial  bank lending  to agriculture  has been largely  to meet SBP  policy  directives. To curb  abuses of
the interest free-loan program, the lead bank system  was introduced in  1987.  Under this system, each union
council was assigned a designated  bank that had the exclusive  right to extend agricultural loans in that union
council. This change in policy  explains the sharp decline in lending from Rs. 7.3 billion in  1986/87  to Rs. 5.2
billion in  1987/88.  With the discontinuation  of interest free-loans,  lending fell further, to Rs. 3.2 billion in
1988/89,  a reduction  of 58 percent over  two  years.
While the principle of lead banking is a safeguard  against multiple lending, it reduces  commercial  bank
financial intermediation, since nonlead branches are restricted only to deposit-taking.  It also introduces an
element  of monopoly  in banking.
To improve the speed of credit delivery and ensure linkages between credit extension and technical
guidance,  the Pakistan Banking Council  introduced  the Supervised  Agricultural  Credit Scheme  in 1987. Initially,
the scheme  was to cover 107  tehsils using  Mobile  Credit  Officers. But progress  has not been satisfactory.
Commercial  bank lending to agriculture  has certain distinct features. First, and most important is that
funding sources are not concessional  lines of credit from the state bank (unlike cooperatives  and the ADBP)  but
instead consist of  their own deposits.  Second, there is a  significant measure of cross-subsidization,  because
interest rates on agricultural loans have generally been mandated  to be lower than those for commercial loans.
Third, as a result of the supervised  credit scheme, commercial  banks now have 3,000 rural branches. Finally,
commercial  banks have provided  effective  financial  intermediation  in rural areas. They have  been able to mobilize
savings  from rural respondents,  whereas other institutions  have functioned  solely  as disbursement  windows. It is
estimated  that 29 percent of commercial  bank deposits are taken in rural areas.  In view of these characteristics,
commercial  banks  could be the central pillar in the design  of a viable  rural financial  system.
Cooperative  Credit. The cooperative movement in  the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent started in  1904 with the
promulgation  of the Cooperative  Credit Societies  Act.  Its basic objective  was to provide an alternative to village24
money-lenders,  who had been the only source of credit. Registrar Cooperative  Societies  were created under this
statute  and empowered powers  to register,  audit, and supervise cooperative  societies. Promotional  work was also
entrusted  to the registrar.
Under  the Cooperative  Societies  Act of 1912,  the governnent extended  the scope  of the movement  beyond
agricultural  credit.  Functionally,  the role of the societies was extended to the supply of inputs such as seed,
manure, and implements, and to the marketing of agricultural produce.  Geographically,  the movement was
expanded  to urban areas for procurement  of goods. Cooperative  societies  were federated  into a secondary  structure
(central  cooperative  banks) at the district  and tehsil level. These in turn were dovetailed  into a provincial  structure
to form provincial  cooperative  banks.
Pakistan inherited the conceptual  framework  of the cooperative  movement,  as well as the organizational
structure,  from British India. The post-independence  history  of the cooperative  movement  can be divided into five
phases.  In the first phase (from the creation of Pakistan to 1955)  the cooperative  movement  was shaped  by the
response  to the mass migration of the trading and industrial community  to India following  the partition of the
subcontinent. Cooperatives began to  support activities such  as  processing of  agricultural raw  materials,
procurement  and distribution  of foodgrains  and consumer  goods,  and financing  of trade.  Even in this early phase,
the cooperative  movement  came to be dominated  by urban businessmen,  who set up many spurious societies  to
obtain credit from cooperative  banks and thus diverted resources  from rural areas. The second phase (1956 to
1961)  was a period  of readjustment  following  the withdrawal  from commercial  activities.
The third phase (1962 to 1966) saw a revival of the cooperative  movement. In 1962 the government
issued a new policy that gave cooperatives  the added role of organizing the distribution  of farm inputs and the
marketing  of output.  Cooperatives  were also expected  to encourage  farm mechanization  to promote  rural industry
and handicraft. A high-powered  Cooperative  Development  Board was set up as an autonomous  entity with five
official  and six unofficial  members. The board acquired  a few industrial  units and extended  loans at concessional
rates to a number of cooperatives  set up  by influential people.  After strong public reaction to the "capitalist
cooperatives",  as they came  to be called,  the government  abolished  the board in 1966.
In the fourth phase (1966  to 1976)  the number  of cooperative  societies  increased  from 16,848  to  29,528.
Most of the societies  were agricultural  cooperatives  (23,000), whose membership  totaled 1.2 million. The tier of
the central cooperative banks was abolished, leaving only the provincial cooperative banks and the primary
societies  in the provinces. At the apex was the  Federal Bank for Cooperatives  (FBC), whose establishment  in
1976  marks  the beginning  of the fifth phase. FBC has a dual charter  of financing  provincial  cooperative  banks and
regulating their activities, and promoting the cooperative  movement.  The provincial  cooperative  banks are the
principal customers of the FBC.  With a  network of 220 branches, these banks cover the country's  11825
administrative  districts.  At the primary level there are 62,681 cooperative societies, with a  total membership  of
nearly 3.5 million (Table 2.6).
Table 2.6 Cooperative  Membership  (1994)
PROVINCE  COOPERATIVES  MEMBERS
Punjab  46,729  2,234,453
Sindh  3,998  747,670
NWFP  7,242  405,472
Baluchistan  752  36,856
Azad Kashmir  3,757  41,327
Northern areas  383  16,466
Total  62,861  3,482,244
Source: Federal  Bank for Cooperatives  (1994).
By June  1994 the FBC had lent Rs. 30.8 billion, of which only Rs. 458 million was for the medium term.
Cooperative  credit is essentially  for short-term  purposes,  mainly  to finance agricultural  inputs. The annual level  of
lending has been about Rs. 3 billion in the last three years. The disbursement  of medium-term  credit during this
period has been less than Rs. 20 million  on average.
In principle, recovery  of loans should not pose a problem, because  loans are guaranteed by  provincial
governments. Yet lending in Sindh was suspended  for five years, and in Baluchistan for ten years because of
persistent  default. The NWFP  also defaulted  in 1994,  and loan operations  had to be suspended. The recovery  rate
in the Punjab (which receives 90 percent of loans) and  the Northern  Areas, however, has been satisfactory (about
90 percent in 1993/94 after scheduling), which has helped to sustain FBC lending operations.  Loans amounting to
Rs. 1058 million outstanding  against Sindh (Rs 419 million), NWFP (Rs 560 million), Azad Kashmir (Rs 56
million)  and Baluchistan  (Rs 23 million)  had to be rescheduled.26
Notwithstanding  good recoveries  in some provinces,  the profitability  of the cooperative  banks is low. In
1993/94  the FBC made a profit of only Rs. 10.8 million. But this is because  the bank operates  on the basis of a
service  charge, which  was as low as 1.49  percent in 1993/94.
The FBC's low level of profitability  is not the main problem, however. Instead, it is that continuous
experimentation  and extensive  changes have eroded confidence  in the cooperative  movement.  Since 1947 the
movement has passed through three periods of debasement  and corruption.  In the 1950s the movement  was
deflected  from its primary constituency,  smallholders. In the early 1980s interest-free  loans were usurped  by the
prosperous  rural elite. A survey  conducted  by the Punjab  Economic  Research  Institute,  concluded  that 61 percent of
the societies  were fictitious  and 73 percent of the loans were bogus. Moreover,  the smaller  farmers were inflating
their farm size to get larger loans and the bigger farmers  were trimming  their holdings  to become eligible  for the
largesse.
In the early 1990's the Cooperative  Finance  Corporations  collapsed  after taking deposits  of Rs. 15 billion
from mostly rural residents  and then investing the funds in risky ventures for the personal gain of cooperative
organizers. These cooperatives  were actually real estate companies  that had managed to register as cooperative
societies.  The government  is endeavoring  to provide  relief to the quarter million  people who were affected  by this
fraud.
The cooperative movement also suffers from several institutional weaknesses, that  have eroded the
movement's  credibility:
*  Uneven Coverage.  Nearly 63,000 cooperative  societies  are located in 15,000  villages, while 30,000
villages have none. Moreover,  34 percent of farms are cultivated  by tenants, who cannot join credit
cooperatives  because  they do not own immovable  property  (a membership  requirement).
*  Highly Subsidized  Rates. Although  interest-free  lending was halted in 1988, the cost of cooperative
credit is still verv  low. A 14 percent rate is charged for production  loans, with a 4 percent rebate  for
prompt payment.
*  Absence of Professional  Management. here remains no mechanism to ensure that only genuine
societies are registered.  The entire cooperative  credit system lacks the professional capacity to
appraise, prioritize, and recover  loans. The audit function  is not being performed  by the Provincial
Cooperative  Department,  which does not have adequate staff, and the provincial cooperative  unions
have no funds for education  and training of society  members27
*  Weak Provincial Banks. The provincial  banks are unable to function as lending agencies.  The
functions of scrutinizing loan  applications, fixing priorities, determination of allocations, and
sanctioning  loans are performed  by the Provincial Cooperative  Department. The provincial  banks
function merely as cashiers of the department. Recovery  powers are also with the department,  not
with bank managers. Recoveries  are subject  to a preemptive  right by the FB3C.  Recoveries  must be
passed on to the FBC within thirty days, while the provincial  banks advances  disbursed  prior to the
establishment  of the FBC  remain blocked  in overdues. The credit received  by these banks from the
FBC is guaranteed  by the provincial  goverrnents, but their own loans to the primary societies  have
no such security.
*  Poor Portfolio  Management. No criteria exist for determining  bad debts.  According  to one internal
estimate, provisions cover only 36 percent of the  loans that  have been overdue for ten years.
Provincial banks have not written off any agricultural loan for the last ten years.  The system  of
classifying loans into performing and  nonperforming does not exist  in  the  provincial banks.
Recoveries  are often affected through the mechanism of sanctioning  fresh loans, thus providing a
false  picture  of the viability  of operations.
*  A Weak  Apex.  The FBC's organizational  structure  is flat, with all major functionaries reporting
directly  to the chief executive. It is concentrated  on loan disbursement  and recovery, and has no
orientation  for research  or development  of cooperation. Its board is large and unwieldy,  and staff  are
in a low state of  morale, accentuated  partly by the frequent shifting  of top management. In 1994
eight managing directors came and left in succession. In terms of financial resources  the FBC is
totally dependent on the state bank, which makes it insecure and uncertain.  The chain of this
debilitating  dependence  goes down  to the primary level,  rendering the entire structure  fragile.
*  No Financial Intermediation. The FBC  has functioned  mainly  as a conduit for cheap credit provided
by the State Bank of Pakistan. It does not mobilize  its own resources. With the present lending rate
of 1.5  percent,  this may not possible.
A comparison  of the lending practices of the ADBP, commercial  banks, and cooperatives  is shown in
Table 2.7
Although  the cooperative  movement  has been successful  in many countries,  including  Taiwan (Box 2.2),
Pakistan's experience  with rural cooperative  credit has been less than satisfactory.  Such movements  must28
be supported  from the top, but they cannot be managed  from the top.  They must grow from the grass
roots,  if they are to survive  on their own strength.
Box  2.2. A Success  Story  in Rural  Credit  Cooperatives:
Taiwan's  Township  Farmer  Associations
The Taiwanese  cooperative  system  consists  of 280  Township  Farmer  Associations  serving  vitually
all farming  families.  Largely  as a result  of this scheme,  farm  productivity  in Taiwan  is among  the highest  in
the world. Interest  rates  charged  by the associations  are positive  and cover  the cost  of funds. By 1970  these
associations  were mobilizing  30 percent  more  funds  from members  than they  were relending  A 1992  study
carried  out by Ohio State University  rates the Taiwanese  scheme  verv  highly on  four important  criteria:
number  of  people  served,  participants'  transaction  costs,  loan  recovery,  and number  of deposits  to agriculture.
The  surplus,  which  continues  to expand,  is being  on-lent  to other  sectors  of  the economy.
As in Korea and Japan,  the Taiwanese  system  was initiated  with U.S. assistance  soon after the
Second  World  War  (1948). A Sino-American  Joint  Commission  on Rural  Reconstruction  (which  became  the
Council  of Agriculture  after  U.S.  involvement  ended  in the 1970s)  was  established  to help  promote  economic
growth.  The program  initially  used  targeted  subsidies  but later  began  to  loosen  up. Apart  from rural  finance,
important  objectives  of the commission  were to carry  out comprehensive  rural land reform  and to promote
more  participatory  runal  government  by establishing  farm cooperatives.  These  institutional  changes  acted  as
a catalyst  in channeling  the already  high  rural  savings  of a progressive  Chinese  rural community  to support
agricultural  growth.29
Table 2.7  Comason  of Lending Practices of Institutional Sources  of Credit
ADBP  Commercial  Banks
..................................................................................................................................................................  ............................................................
Purpose of the loan  25% production & 75 %  78% productions  loans  NA
(1991-92)  development  loans.
Credit targeted at  42.8%  76.7%,  but suveys show many  96.6%, but surveys  show that
subsistence  framers  of these  to be proxy loans for  many coop societies  were one
big landlords  man operations.
Collateral  Tangible suity  reqmured  63% of disbursement  through  land and other immovable
requirement  for medium term loans  personal sureties,  passbooks  property
(land) also common
Loan recovery  rate  600/o  NA  Good in Punjab & Northern
areas (about 900/o  of the
rescheduled  loans). Loan
operations  were suspended  in
Sindh and NWFP.
Treatment of default  Laws exist on paper but  Existing laws not enforced  Existing laws not enforced.
not enforced  Special Coop  Tribunals
proposed  to improve
enforcement.
Supervision  of credit  In theory, 1400 MCO's are  A small number of Agricultural  Poor coordination  between
utilization  supposed to supervise  officers  results in inadequate  provincial government
credit closely,  MCO's in  supervision  departments  and the Federal
turn are monitored  by  Coop  Bank renders
credit officers  supervision  inadequate.
Cost of credit delivery  9.1%  18.6%  15.8%
(esfimated)
Source:  Agricultural Statistics  of Pakistan. 1991-92  and various other sources.
B:  Informal Credit
The credit needs of the  majority of rural  enterprises  are  met in large part by informal  credit  sources,
based essentially on personal contact and local sanction.  The informal market can be divided into four categories.
Socially based arrangements,  commercial arrangements, a land-based system, and money lenders
Sociallv Based Arrangements.  One-third of noninstitutional credit comes from friends and relatives who
do not charge interest and operate on the basis of reciprocity.30
Friends and relatives  sometimes  operate through a committee  system.  These committees  (also called bisis)
are common  in developing  countries.  Termed  ROSCAs  (Rotating  Savings  and Loan Associations)  in the economic
literature,  their local nomenclature varies from country  to country.  These committees,  which are more popular in
urban areas, enforce  the discipline  of compulsory  savings. In India and Cameroon  some of these committees  have
evolved  into banks.
ROSCAs  are fairly simple structures.  A leader takes  the initiative and organizes  a small group of people
(from six to forty) who regularly  pool savings in an agreed amount. The collection  is offered  to each member in
turn, interest free.  The leader generally takes the first collection.  He or she receives  no other compensation.
Leaders sometimes  take a commission  in exchange  for responsibility  for preventing  default.
In Pakistan two types of committees  are common:  ordinary committees  and discount-based  committees.
Ordinary committees  correspond  to the basic structure  of ROSCAs.  Members  pool their savings and receive  the
money in rotation, the leader taking the first collection.  The draw is commonly  on a monthly basis. Members
continue to pay the regular contribution  until the cycle is completed  and all have received the proceeds  from one
collection.
The discount-based  committee,  also called the auction-based  committee,  is organized in the same manner
as the ordinary committee,  but the basis of disbursement  is the lowest  bid at a regular auction. The difference
between  the amount collected  and that disbursed  is shared equally by committee members,  who usually use this
profit to reduce  their contribution.  Those  who do not participate in the auction get the comrnittee  fund at the end.
A third institution, called the lucky committee,  although  banned, continues  to operate illegally  in some
places. It operates essentially as a  lottery.  The amount to be drawn every month is lower than the monthly
collection  and announced in advance.  The difference  between  the collection  and the disbursement  goes to the
organizer.  The disbursement  is made by drawing lots, and the winner does not pay any future contributions.
Those who  are not lucky will get their disbursement  at the end. The organizer  makes a sizable  monthly  profit. The
committee  thus becomes  a business venture and ceases to be a purely savings instrument.  The excitement of the
lucky draw replaces  the regularity  and predictability  of the ordinary  committee.
Commercially  Based Credit. This  type is credit is linked  with the supply  of inputs  or the purchase  of output,  and is
common  among the farming community.  The marketing  intermediaries  who extend the credit may be commission
agents (arhtis) or village traders or shopkeepers. According  to some estimates  this channel provides 25 percent of
rural credit.  About 17 percent of the noninstitutional  credit for farmers comes from this source,  and with more
organized  marketing  its importance  may increase. Microenterprises  usually  use this type  of credit.31
Credit from suppliers  are quite popular even though the difference  in prices for cash terms and credit
terms may be substantial, implying a  high rate of interest. While farmers can get production loans from
institutional  sources  to cover the cost  of inputs, microenterprises  have to depend  on market  channels. Most  of them
purchase  their raw material  on credit for up to a month. Interest  rates show a wide variation,  from 2 percent  to 15
percent per month, and are implicit in the excess  prices charged  on credit-based  purchases.  According  to a survey
conducted  by Development  Research and Management Services  for the World Bank Project on Microenterprises,
the difference  in prices can frequently  be between  10  percent and 15 percent.
Buyers sometime  make advance  payments  to producers to help them purchase raw materials. Although
this payment  is disguised  as an advance,  there is an implicit interest rate, which can be as high as 15 percent a
month. This arrangement  is reversed  in case  of the parchi system.  The parchi is basically  an IOU  given by a buyer
who does not wish to make a cash payment.  Instead, the buyer issues a parchi at a higher price. The parchi
indicates  the quantity,  price, date of payment,  and aggregate  amount. Parchis can be discounted  in the market. The
implicit  rates are between  2 and 7 percent  per month. The period of maturity  varies between  twenty  and sixty days.
Confidence  in the viability  of the borrower  is critical,  because  there is no legal recourse.
Land Based  Credit Arrangements. Land-based  credit is the informal instrument  used by tenants and subsistence
farmers. It is widely  used in Sindh, Baluchistan,  and Southern  Punjab. The credit is extended  by the landlord  for
purchase  of inputs and for consumption.  No collateral  is required,  but conventionally  the credit constitutes  the first
charge on the produce.  According  to the 1973  rural credit survey  interest rates for this type of credit were about 60
percent higher than institutional  rates. About 11 percent of informal finance comes from this source. With the
decline  of feudal  influence,  its importance  may diminish  over  time.
Money Lenders.  Since independence,  professional  moneylenders  have not been a significant part of the credit
system  in the rural areas. According  to a survey  of five Asian countries  credit comes from moneylenders  averages
only 6 percent of rural credit. In Pakistan the proportion  is even smaller. The rate of interest varies from 2 to 4
percent  per month, and interest has to be paid monthly. Moneylending  is considered  an unworthy  profession  and
its importance  is declining.
Informal  credit generally  has a low  transaction  cost and a short transaction  time. There are no proceduml
rigors the  lag between agreement and  disbursement of  credit is  minimal, no  collateral is  required, and
documentation  is minimal.  At the same time, there are no standard terms and conditions, and there is great
variation in interest  rates and maturity  periods.  Interest  rates are usually  twice  institutional  rates. Interest  rates can
be usurious  where competition  from the formal market  is weak. Due to growing  availability  of formal credit, the
rates of interest for informal credit are believed to be declining, although firm data are not available. Where
commodity  transactions  are involved,  interest  charges  are generally  not explicit  but are embedded  in prices.32
The informal  credit market is not regulated.  There are no reserve ratios or pmdential regulations. The
lender is responsible  for his own viability. Legal recourse  on default is rare, which is one reason why loans are
small and short term. The room for freedom  helps the informal  market  to respond  effectively  to changing  needs.
The informal market is undergoing structural changes in  response to  the  evolving socioeconomic
landscape. The role of landlords  and moneylenders  is declining.  The share of market  intermediaries  is increasing
as commercialization  of agriculture  proceeds  apace.
The informal market  does not distinguish  between  production  and consumption.  The institutional  market
does not cater to consumption,  and the informal  market  fills the vacuum.
The main limitations  of the market  pertain to scale, space, and time. The market  is segmented  from the
national financial  system,  reducing  its capacity  for financial  intermediation.  Informal  finance is essentially  a local
phenomenon  depending  on local contacts. Its fragmented  and local character  is both its strength and weakness.
Freedom  from regulation  is also  a double-edged  source.  The market  gains flexibility,  adaptability,  and resilience
but it loses protective  legal mechanisms.
The informal  sources  do not provide  term finance  for investment,  housing  finance,  being a major
exception.
The informal  market  is responsive  to vicissitudes.  It caters  to temporary  gaps in consumption,  inunediate
unforeseen  contingencies,  and emergent  situations. In a healthy  economic  system,  the institutional  market  should
circumscribe  the use of the informal  market  as a lever in the balance  of economic  power.33
Chapter  3.  Rural  Credit  for Poverty  Alleviation
Policy-directed credit to the rural poor is justified on grounds of the equity objective as well as the markets'
failure to assess the risk of lending to the poor and develop  instruments for nmnaging that risk  Access  to policy-directed
credit can help the poor by enabling them to acquire assets and support consumption in times of distress.  The policy
rsponse  has been to provide cheap credit to poor households because it is believed that the poor cannot afford market
interest rates, institutional lenders are too cautious, and professional moneylenders are  exploitative.  However, the
international experience  vith  government schemes to provide cheap credit to the rural poor is not very encouraging
(reviewed in World Development  Report 1990). Only 5 percent of poor farmers in Africa and  15 percent in Asia and
Latin America have had access to such credit  Surveys  carried out in Pakistan show that  the poorest flumers obtain less
than 6 percent of their credit from formal sources (see Tables 1.8 and 1.9).
The problem is twofold: First, targeting the poor has been difficult, so much of the subsidized  credit has leaked
to the relatively  richer rural households. Second, because  transaction costs of lending to the poor are high, the subsidy  for
such cheap credit becomes large and renders the programs unsustinable.  Thus many countries,  including Pakistan,
have sought to create special vehicles for delivering credit to the poor  in the  form of direct income transfers  or
credit for income-generating  activities.  This  chapter  presents  a  profile of the  rural  poor in Pakistan  and  then
reviews the existing mechanisms for delivering credit to them in order to derive lessons for policy reform.
A:  Rural  Poverty  Profile
Pakistan's  record in  poverty reduction compares well with the star economic performers in  Asia (Table
3.1). Between  1962 and  1984 poverty in Pakistan fell  from  54  percent to  23 percent.  The  evidence on  rural
poverty, however, is mixed.  Although the percentage of rural households in poverty has declined in recent years,
rural areas now account for a greater proportion of the poor than in the past.  The number of households in poverty
declined from 21.1 percent to 15.5 percent between  1984/85 and 1987/88 (Table 3.2).  However, 85 percent of  all
poor  households reside  in rural  areas,  a slight  increase compared  to  1984/85.  Figure  3.1  presents  a  regional
perspective of the concentration  of the poor in rural areas. Table 3.2 also reports an index of poverty, which shows
that the concentration of the poor in rural areis  increased from  1984/85 to 1987/88.34
Table 3.1  Chang in Poverty  Incidence  (percentage)
Country  and period  Poor  population in initial year  Poor 2oDulation  in final vear
Pakistan  (1962-84)  54  23
India (1972-83)  54  43
Thailand (1962-86)  59  26
Malaysia  (1973-87)  37  15
Indonesia  (1970-87)  58  17
Source: World  Bank, World  Development  Report  1990.
Table 3.2: Incidence  of PovertS  in Pakistan
Head  Percentage  Percentage  Index'  Headcount  Percentage  Percentage  Index'
count  share  share  share  share
Moor  popultn.  poor  popultn
Overall  18.3  100.0  100.0  100  13.1  100.0  100.0  100
Rural  21.1  83.21  72.17  115  15.5  85.82  72.61  118
Urban  11.1  16.79  27.68  61  6.8  14.18  27.53  52
.................................................................................................................................................................................................................................
'  Percentage  share of poor households  divided  by the category's  share of total households.
Note: The poor in 1984/85  are defined  to be those households  whose  incomes  are below  that required  to meet
expenditures  of Rs. 150  per capita needed  to consume  2,550  calories. The poverty  line for 1987/88  is adjusted  for
the price increase.
Source: S.J. Malik, Poverty  in Pakistan.  July 1991 IFPRI,  Washington,  D.C.
Agriculual  credit  for  productivity  growth wouid  in itself help alleviate  rural pwerty by incsng  rurl
incomes  and creating  nonfain rural  income  opportunities.  However,  there  remains  a large  group  of the nual destitute  in
Pakisan who need  credit  to engage  in sustainable  income-generating  activities.  This group  of the rurl  poor  consts
about  20  percent  of the rural  population.35
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The largest  roncentrations  of the  rural poor are among the landless (45 percent) and  among tenants  and
marginal landowners (46 percent).  Livestock  constitutes the most important source of income for the rural poor (28
percent),  followed  by crop income (24  percent) and nonfarm microenterprise  (20 percent) Cable  3.3).  Rural poverty
alleviation programs would have to focus on these principal sources of income to lift the poor out of poverty.  Indirecty,
of course, a credit program for agriculture would increase crop incomes as well as income from farm labor.  However,
credit programs for rural microenterprises  and to support consumption  for the very  poor would still be needed.
Table 3.3  ncome Sources  of the Rural Poor (percentage)
Share  of incme 6 ~.....................................  ......  i.......................... .......
Livestock  28
Crops  24
Nonfarm enterprise  20
Wages and salaries  18
Remittances  7
Other sources  3
Source  Aly Alp Ercelawn, 'Poverty in Rural Palkstan:  A Study of Villages"
In I. Nabi, The Ouality of Life in Pakistan: Studies in Social Sector Economics
(Vanguard), 1986.36
B: Promwm  for Credit  Deliverv  to the  Poor
N  an-zvmetal  Orlzuanizons
Bangaesh's  Grameen  Bank, pahaps the most successUl  NGO credit program for rural  poverty  alleviaton, has
inspired  simila efforts  not only  in other  developing  countris, such as Malaysia  and Indonesia,  but also in the United
States.  The salient  features  of Grameen  Bank  are reviwvd  in Box 3.1.
In Pakistan  there  are about  12,000  registered  NGOs  . Of  these,  6,000  exst on paper  only  and 3,500  are religious
NGOs (deeni  madarssas, for example). About 1F0 NGOs are engaged  actively  in economic  and social  welfare.
Foremost  among  these  is the urban-based  Orangi  Pnrject,  which  gives  technical  assistance  and institutional  and  financial
support  to Karachi's  slum dwellers But of greater  interest  for nual financial  marcets  is the Agha Khan Rural Support
Projct  (AKRSP).
AEha  Khan  Rural  SuVwDort  Prom
The AKRSP  started  in 1983  in Gilgit,  a remote,  mountainous  northern  area of Pakistan,  to tadde the problems
of poerty and destitution. The program  has three components.  At the core is the economic  program,  which aims  to
change  the incentive  structure  to get more effort  from households  and thereby  increase  incomes. Complementing  the
economic  program the social and the technical  components. The former focuses  on changing  village organization
sWres  to accommodate  technical  and economic  change;  the latter  provides  skldls  and  techniques  needed  for social  and
economic  renewal.
By most  cxiteria,  the AKRSP  has  been  an outstanding  success  (Table  3.4). It has  succeeded  in all three  program
camonents.  The credit operations  are based on on-lending  of funds borrowed  by AKRSP  or received  from donors.
Repayment  rates  are very  high and default  is negligible  (ordy  1.7  percent  of short-term  loans  and 1 percent  of medium-
term loans are in default). Fertilizer  purchase  and narbeting  operations  account  for 87 percent  of the short-term  credit
provided  by the AKRSP.  Medium-term  credit  is used  for land  development  and purchase  of  agricultural  machinery.
The AKRSP  started  its credit  program  with  a loan  from Habib  Bank,  which  was  on-lent  interest  free,  but there
was  a penalty  of 1  percent  per month  in case  of default. Since  1988  a service  charge  rangingbetween  10  and 15 percent  is
leviet  on all loans.
It is not clear  whether  the directed  credit  under  the AKRSP  program  achieved  significant  additionality  in credit
didburuement.  What is mnore,  the AKRSP  mandate  may  be too broad.  Its economic  and social  program  will in the long
run expand  the demand  for credit  and hence  will drain  the program's  scarce  managerial  staff. The best program  design
might  wel be a two  program  types:  trade  off  between  a focused  program  on credit  that  does  not provide  the technical  and37
organizational  support  needed  for economic  uplifl,  and a broader  program  that works in tandem with exting  cedit
institutions  to  streamline  their  operations  and ensure  that  borrwers put credit  to its best  use.
Table 3.4.  AKRSP  Performance  in Selected  Areas
1983  1988  Percentage  change
.. .....................................................................................................................................................  .....................................................................
14o.  of Village  organizations  131  993  658
Women's  organizations  10  248  2,380
Training  courses  conducted  per  year  4  37  825
Projects  identified  363  1346  270
Projects  completed  23  514  2,135
Rural households  benefiting  (percentage)  12  52  5,100
Deposits  byviDlage  and women's  organizations  (Rs  millions)  0.8  51.3  6,312
Credit  disursed annually  (Rs  millions)  1  34.6  3,360
Credit  recipients  (thousand  households)  4.7  61.0  1,198
.Source:  World  Bank 'The Agha  Khan  Rural Support  Program  in Pa.istan:  A Second  Interim  Evaluatiort"  Washington,
D.C., 1990.
Family Planing  Association  of Pakistan.  The Family Planning Association  of Pakistan (FPAP) has
provided  loans to some 2,000 women  for income-generating  activities  since 1984  at twenty locations. Each year
interest-free loans are offered to five to seven women in each location.  Loan recipients are selected by local
women's committees  based on their personal  knowledge  of applicant's circumstances  and attitudes.  The loans from
Rs. 500 to Rs. 1,000  have a six to seven month term and are repaid in monthly  installments  of Rs. 50 to Rs. 100.
Borrowers  pay a nominal monthly  membership  fee until the loan is repaid in full.  Monthly  fees are used for skill
training for applicants.  Loans are made  principally  for goat rearing, poultry  farming, food preservation,  tailoring,
and small  businesses.
The FPAP also operates  a UNDP-funded  credit and training program at three locations. Women  receive
loans for preselected  activities  based on their skills, market  potential,  and FPAP's experience  in the area. Women
are encouraged  to form a loose cooperative  with a nominal membership  fee. They hold regular meetings  and are
given training in their respective  activities.  The loan was from Rs. 5,000 to Rs. 10,000 at each location. This
program has been running very successfully,  with negligible defaults.  Beneficiaries  have also expressed their
satisfaction  with the loan scheme,  and some are now contributing  Rs. 500  to Rs. 15,000  per month to their family
income.38
Box 3.1 Bangladesh's Grameen  Bank: A Model Program to Serve  the Rural Poor
The success of Bangladesh's Grameen Bank in meeting the credit needs of the rural poor is due in large
part to the bank's  ability to control the often high transaction costs of lending to this segment of the market
Grameen Bank overcame  this problem through a group-based  lending program that uses peer pressure to monitor
and enforce  contracts and to screen  good borrowers  from bad.
The bank targets poor landholders with less than 0.50 acres.  It lends for natural disasters and provides
loans for food storage and capital recovery  in addition to providing  loans. Borrowers are required to attend weekly
meedings  and participate in other welfare activities. Because the opportunity  cost of the meetings is high and loan
amounts are small (US$65 for the first loan rising to a maximum of US$250 for subsequent loans), large farmers
and other rural rich are excluded from the program.  The Bank's principal target group is women (who constitute
94 percent of total bank membership and receive 80 percent of total lending).  Along with loans, they receive
training in maternal health, nutrition, and child care as part of the Bank's comprehensive social development
prograra
Started in 1983, Grameen Bank has grown in terms of both members and outstanding loans in a short
time.  In 1994 there were 1,045 Grameen Bank branches covering 2 million members in 35,000 villages (more
than half the villages in Bangladesh).  E'^tween 1985-1993, its membership increased 960 percent to 1.8 million
members, 98 percent of whom are actually borrowers. Total loans outstanding increased from taka 244 million in
1985 to taka 11 billion in 1994.  The bank also has mobilized  rural savings, which increased from taka ilS
million in 1985 to taka 8.97 billion in mid-1993.  The bank has a loan recovery rate exceeding 95 percent.  The
program drop out rate is low,  and borrowers,  on average, save 19  percent of the loan amount they receive.
Leadership was vital in the bank's early stages. But what has mattered in the longer run are features that
have ensured the institution's financial viability such as group-based  lending and decentralization,  which  facilitate
close  contact with borrowers and ensures their financial viability. These institutional characteristics allow a quick
asessnent  of loan recovery performance and branch profitability.  These features, combined with greater on-
lending and an increase in the lending rate from 16 to 20 percent, have reduced the bank's subsidy dependency
index from 1.66  percent in 1987  to 0.73 percent in 1993. To eliminate the bank's subsidy dependency,  on-lending
interest  rates  would have to increase from 16 to 28 percent, given 1993  figures.
Sore:  Based on S. Khandker,  B. Khalily, and Z. Khan. (1994). Is Grameen  Bank Sustainable? HRO Working Paper
No. 23, World Bank, Washington,  D.C.39
Sindh Rural Worker Cooperative  Organization.  The Sindh Rural Worker Cooperative  Organization
covers 153 villages with 5,000 members in  13 districts of the province. Each of the 153 cooperatives  is self-
financed and self-managed.  The projects relate to physical  and social infrastructure.  It has a successful  savings
program and recently  started credit operations.
Credit  for Self-employment
The number  of unemployed  in the country  in 1994  is estimated  at 2.2 million. Of these, 63 percent,  or 1.4
million,  are in rural areas. To mitigate  the rigors  of unemployment  and provide  opportunities  for entrepreneurship,
a self-employment  program  was started  in 1992.  The following  institutions  participate  in this scheme:
*  National  Bank of Pakistan
*  Habib  Bank Limited
Small  Business  Finance  Corporation
*  Youth  Investment  Promotion  Society
Punjab  Small Industries  Corporation
*  Sindh Small  Industries  Corporation
In addition,  several institutions  are operating  their own small loans scheme  with similar  objectives.  These
are:
*  First Women  Bank
*  Regional  Development  Finance  Corporation
*  Agricultural  Development  Bank of Pakistan
From mid-1992  to mid-1994  the Small  Business  Finance Corporation,  Habib  Bank Limited, and National
Bank of Pakistan sanctioned loans worth Rs. 5.6 billion with the  generation of an estimated 96,057 jobs.
Investment  cost per job is Rs. 58,000,  which compares  favorably  with a cost of Rs. 459,000  per job created  in the
large and medium  sector  financed  by IDBP,  PICIC and NDFC (at a total cost  of Rs. 6.88 billion  for 15,000  jobs) in
this period.  Loan recovery, at 70 percent, is higher  than the recovery  ratio for larger industries.
Information  on the rural component  of this program  is available  only  for the schemes  of the Punjab Small
Industies Corporation,  which was designed  for rural areas, and the Youth Investment  Promotion  Society,  which
maintains separate  statistics  for the rural areas. The Punjab Small Industries Corporation  has so far advanced  Rs.
1.6 billion for 6,110 projects  and generated  employment  for 61,000 people.  The total cost of these projects  is Rs.
4.35 billion. Since  its inception  in 1987,  the Youth  Investment  Promotion  Society  has sanctioned  loans amounting40
to Rs. 5.7 billion, providing employment  to 63,000 people.  Current annual lending is about Rs. 1 billion, with
nual areas receiving  37 percent of this sum and 43 percent  of jobs generated. The viability  of these programs  will
have  be examined  carefully.
The government  recently approved an integrated program for self-employment  with a mnximum loan
limit of Rs. 300,000 per individual, interest rate of 14.5 percent and repayment over five to seven years.  The
participating  institutions  would  be:
*  Small  Business  Finance  Corporation
*  National  Bank of Pakistan
*  Habib  Bank Limited
*  Youth Investment  Promotion  Society
*  First Women  Bank
- Regional  Development  Finance Corporation
*  Agricultural  Development  Bank
In terms of investment  cost per job and the diffusion  of economic  benefits,  the program shows  promise.
The following points must be considered  in its implementation:
*  Separate  data should be maintained  for rural areas to permit a careful  assessment  of the impact  of the
program in rural areas.
*  Equality  of access  should  be ensured  for rural applicants.
*  Small industries  corporations  can be included  in the program or cnsured adequate  credit to continue
their schemes  for self-employment.
*  Future financing  of the program can be linked  with recovery  and the ability  to implement  the schemes
properly.41
Chapter  4. Reform of Rural Credit Policy and Institutions
The rural  credit  market  needs  to operate  efficiently  in order  to facilitate  better  performance  of the rural eonomy
and help  pmmote  economic  growth Inefficiences  in rural  credit  markst  arise  partly  due to asymmetic  infomation  and
imerfect enforcement  of loan contracts,  and partly  to misdirected  government  intventions.  If the finanal  institutions
are to play  an important  role  in facilitatng  faster  econormc  growth,  the rural  credit narkets  must  be liberalized.
The strate  is to have  a iberalized  rural  financal market  with  strengthened  role  of the State  Bank of Pakistan
in prdentWi regulation  and institutional  development  (with the help o flhe NGOs)  for rural credit services  for small
holders  and the poor. The  government  must  neither  contol the financal institutions  nor  set the interest  rates.  Instd,  the
government  should shift the focus to prudential  regulation  and tighter supervision.  At the same time, the financal
institutions  must liberalize  themselves  from traditional  thinking  and practices  in rural  finance  and introduce  innovative
product  design  to suit  the needs  of small  farm  and nonfarm  producers.
Ruaal financial  hberalization  along  with  prudential  regulation  and supervision  is a first  step  toward  promoting
efficiency  in the rural credit market However,  specialized  programs  and institutions  would  also  be requred to deliver
credit to the small  producers  and the poor.  But this should  be done in a manner that the financal viability  of the
programs  is ensured.
This  chapter sets  out the guiding  princples for designing  a rational  rural credit  policy,  makes general  policy
recommendations  regarding prudential  regulations  and supervision  and suggest  a prioritization  of credit delivery,
recommendations  are also  made  for reorienting  credit  delivery  practices  of the existing  financial  institutions.
Guiding  Principles  for a Rational  Rural  Credit Policy
A rational  rural  credit  policy  would  consist  of  the following  elements:
*  The government  needs  to replace  the current  policies  that result in financial  repression  by policies  for pnrdential
regulation  and supervision  accompanied  by strong  measures  for macro-economic  stabilization.
*  A competitive  environment  will have  to be ensured  for the commercial  banks,  who then must  be allowed  to set the
interest  rate  to cover  transaction  costs  of rural lending.  This  would  enable  them  to serve  better  the financal needs  of
commercial  and large-size  borrowers  in rural  areas.
*  Credit  must  be made  available  to spport prodUctivity  gowth in smallholder  agriculture  and small  producers  in the
rural nonfann sector.  Because  of small  loan size,  the transaction  costs  of lending are high for which commercal
banks  may  not deliver  credit  to small  producers.  When smallholders  constitute  the bulk  of the farming  community42
and snail produes  account  for the majority  of rural  nonfarm  producers,  specializ  institutions  need  to be created
outside  the govenmnt, with help  fiom  NGOs  or private  groups.  These  institutions  will have  to be innovative  (such
as use of grWp  pressure  to collect  loan)  and overcome  the marW failure  that arises  from high uansaction  costs  of
wail  loans.
*  Cedit must  be available  to the rural  poor and women  for consumption  smoohing and for promoting  staiable
income  generating  aciities. Due to the perception  that  the poor  and  women  are high  credit  risk  and have  no physical
collaral  commercial  banks may not advance  loans to them, even if the banks are hiberalized  from taditional
practices  of rural  finance.  Specialized  finania  institutions  may  be necessary  for  meeting  the credit  needs  of the rural
poor  and women.
*  Unencumbered  capital  base  is crucial  to  specialized  financial  instutions for proiding credit  to smallholders  and the
poor. This  capital  base  can be built either  by subscribed  capital  from the government  or interested  donors  or from
retained  earnings  from operations.  Such  capital  will help  to absorb  the initial  stan-up cost When  the market  fails to
meet  credit  needs  of the disadvantaged  sector,  paid-up  capital for  the initial  period  to subsidize  transactions  costs  are
recsary  to develop  such  financia institutions.  These  flmds  should  be given  on such  conditions  that will  ensure  self-
sinabhility of these  institutions.  Ultimate  borrowers  will  pay  the market  interest  rate.
*  The interest  rate should  never  be subsidized  (i.e.,  it should  not  be less  than the market  interest  rate)  even  if the credit
is aget  Otherwise,  the powerfil  and  the more  affluent  in the society  would  divert  these  resources  for meetng their
axds. Exchlsion  of the nontarget  households  or sector,  however,  must be ensured  through program design.  For
example,  program participation  should be made so expensive  for the nontarget  households  that they find it
unprofitable  to  participate  in specialized  financial  programs  targeted  at the rurl poor.
*  The criteria  for  the inclusion  of target  households  in the program  of the specialized  institutions  should  be such (e.g.,
smai loans,  group  accountability  and group  pressure)  that leads  to self-selection.  This is also necessary  to promote
loans  only  to those  who  will use  credit  productively  and are able  to generate  income  and hence,  repay  the loan.  The
self-selection  procedure  would  promote  borrowers'  financial  viability  as well  as loan  repayment.
*  Policy  intrventions  that  create  special  lending  institutions  to meet  the credit  needs  of small  producers  (both  farm and
nonfaim)  and the poor  must  be subject  to  conditions  that  quire  their  financial  vLability  by  reducing  their dependency
on sinsidized  flnids.  The conditions  are (i) adequate  loan  recvery, (ii) market  interest  rates,  and (iii)  mobilization  of
deposits.
*  Wben scane resources  are targeted  to special  groups  such as smallholders,  small nonfarm  producers,  the poor,  or
women,  transparent  criteria  must  be established  to continuously  evaluate  and monitor  the performance  of both  the
tareting agenies and  their  clients.43
In sum, nrua finance  must  be sen  as an integral  part of equitable  development  within  a fiamework  of macro-
econonic  stability.  The policy  thrust should  be towards  financial  liberalization  but subject  to prudential  regulation  and
supervision  by the State  Bank of Pakistan  (SBP).  Subsidies  should  be transparent,  sharply  focused  only  to subsidize  the
financial  and insitutional  costs  and subject  to phasing  out. At any rate  no lending  should  be undertaken  at interest  rates
lower  than those  charged  to  the prime  customers.  The  essence  of a progressive  policy  lies not  in pushing  money  at people
but in the ability  to improve  their bankability  and the productivity  of their enterprise.  Above  all, the viability  of the
financal system  must  not  be jeopardized  for short-term  political  gains.
General  Polcy Recommendations
Prudential  Regulations
The  principle  for the govermment  to follow  on rural  finance  is that  it does  not contrcl  either  financial  products
or the interest  rates.  The govermment  intervention  in the rural  credit  market  should  be limited  only  to prudcnt  regulation
and supervsion  which  will have  to be ensured  and enforced  before  liberalization  policy  is carried  out. The prudential
regulatory  and supervisory  policies  include  promotion  of legal,  administrative,  and financial  discipline,  particularly  the
eliSorecability  of contracts,  timely recovery  of loans and dues, restraints  on use of personal discretion  in financial
dispensation,  and  full disclosure  of  business  information  to and  by the financial  institutions.
The need for prudential  regulation  and supervision  arises  from the role of the banks as trustees  (because  the
money  belongs  to depositors  and they  do not have  control  over  bank management).  Prudential  regulation  and supervision
can help avoid  the collapse  of the financial  institutions  for mismanagement  and over-ambitious  investments.  Prudential
regulation  will restrict  banks' entry  on selective  basis (licensing  of banks), ensure  adequate  capital-deposit  ratios, and
maintain  adequate  liquidity  in the system,  adequate  provision  for bad loans,  and early  intervention  system  in cases of
impending  bank  failures.  These  prudential  policies  must  be supported  by  measures  that  provide  adequate  legal  framework
for loan recovery,  make  the bank management  accountable,  institute  standards  for audit  by the State  Bank, and provide
government  support  to minimize  loan delinquency  and to prevent  the chances  of fiscal  liability,  the pressure  for which
emerges  when  such  financial  institutions  go under. 6
With such prudential  regulatory  and supervisory  policies,  the government  must leave the banking system
primarily  in the private  sector. Although  public sector  banking has facilitated  the implementation  of state policies,
experience  has proved  that this could be done in the private  sector more efficiently  without  hazard to viability.  A
liralized  system  would  be more  conducive  to innovation  for resource  mobilization  and to competitive  efficiency.  The
6'ihe  overdues  of the financial  institutions  have  already  accumulated  to more  than Rs. 80 billion. Even  if some  of the
financial  institutions  may  be privatized,  the present  setup  has a major  responsibility  for ensuring  adequate  recovery.  This
is not merely  a legal or administrative  matter.  The transition  from  default  to discipline  is more like  a cultural  change.  It
requires  total  transformation  and government  commitment.  It is gratifying  that  the government  has accepted  the challenge
and  is mounting  special  efforts  to effect  recovenes.  This  effort  must  be continued.44
financil  institutions must be liberalized from direct government control. Since supervision and policy direction wowld
vest in the State Bank, privatization  would not confhict  with the fundamentals of prudent credit and economic  policies.
Prioritizing Credit Delivery
Once prudent regulatory  and supenivsory  policies are established and effectively  enforced, the government must
leave  the  banking  system primarily  to  the  private  sector.  Although public  sector banking  has  facilitated the
implementation  of state policies,  experience has proved  that the prvate sector  can operate more efficiently,  without  hazard
to viability. Although market forces are efficient in resource  allocation and distribution,  however, they do not always meet
social objectives  such as poverty alleviation.  Commercial banks will continue to meet the credit needs of the richer 10
percent 3f rural households who own more than 25 hectares of land. In fact, the provision of financial services to this
group will be more efficient and effective  with the liberalization  of interest rates. Some argue that large holders may need
an access through a directed program, but this paper argues that if government intervention is withdrawn, large holders'
access  to credit from commercial  banks would greatly improve.  (See  Box 4.1).
Box 4.1  Should there be Directed Credit For Large Holders?
Whether or not large holders would continue to have access to commercial credit in the absence of government
intervention is a much debated issue in Pakistan.  Those who argue against complete liberalization on grounds that
this would completely dry up commercial credit to large farmers include bankers as well as farmers, The
arguments are: (i) The Land Alienation Act that governs the terms under which agricultural land can be
transferred renders it a poor collateral against the risk of default; this problem is further compounded by poor land
registration practices; (ii) farming methods are not streamlined so that yield estimates and the risk of crop failure
are hard to assess; unlike other sectors of the economy, it is hard to project income and profitability of the farming
enterprise (as it currently stands); the absence of crop insurance further compounds this problem;  (iii) the
transactions costs of dealing even with the large farmers are high; farmers are widely dispersed and bank branches
are not always conveniently located; moreover, land may be divided into several parcels spread over a large
geographical area, which makes monitoring performance very difficult; and (iv) in Pakistan's political economy,
large farmers are extremely -well connected, which renders loan recovery difficult and  acquisition,  of assets in
case of default impossible.  It is thus concluded that without government directed credit, no commercial bank
would be willing to lend to large farmers.  It is argued further that interest rates that incorporate a hefty risk
premium would lead to the well-known problem of adverse selection since the more risky farmers will bid away
loanable funds, secure that they cannot be dispossessed of their land.
The argument in favor of complete liberalization of commercial credit is that all of the hurdles listed above
are in fact a consequence of paternalistic  government intervention in rural finance, Nearly half a century of
directed subsidized credit has promoted irresponsible borrowing habits.  After liberalization,  it may be that initially
credit would be available only to those large farmers who have organized their farms along commercial lines, In
time this would encourage others to follow similar practices to make themselves credit worthy.  Those who choose
not to modernize might be denied credit (or would have to pay a high risk premium to obtain it) and they would
eventually have to sell land.  This would contribute to the development of a market for land.  Like any other asset,
rates of return on land will then will be an important factor in land ownership, And like any other asset, income
from land would be taxable.  The agriculture sector then will come into the fold of the modem economy.45
Priorities  for  certain  disadvantaged  groups,  however, ay appear  prudent  whrre  the market  does  not adequately
address  their  needs, A focused  pnority  pmgram  for rural  finance  could  be undertaken  without  jeopardizing  the gwth  or
efficiency  of the financial  systemL  Prioritization  of rural  activities  may be necessary  for a number  of reasons.
First,  the long-term  potential  gains  from some  economic  activities  do not translate  into short-term  gains for the
actors. Second,  some  activities  have  substantial  economic  benefits  but are not commercial  in natwe (for  example,  much  of
the physical  and social  inftuc  ).  Finally,  the financi  institutions'  hentage  of asset-based  rather  than project-based
lending  predisposes  them  to an orientation  that may  not  be effective  for  certain  groups  of rural  producers  (such  as assetless
poor).
The priority sectors  for targeting  are (1) smallholders  with ten acres or less; (2) nonfarm activities  of a
noncommercial  nature  such as livestock,  fishery,  forestry,  and range lands;  (3) microenterprises;  and (4) rural and poor
women. These  sectors  deserve  special  attention  in the interest  of reducing  poverty,  promoting  broad-based  development
(through  diversification  of crops  and rural economy),  slowing  of rural-urban  migration,  and establishing  meaningful
linkages  between  the rural  economy  and  the urban  economy.
The segment  holding  ten acres  or less represents  70  percent  of the farming  community.  There  should  be a
specal  focus  on this  stratum  because  of their  poverty  and  vast  numbers.  Similarly,  the nonfanm  community  in agriculture,
which  includes  landless  tenants  and marginal  farmers,  needs  to  be supported. Although  this group  contnbutes  about  40
percent  of agricultural  GDP,  it receives  only  6 percent  of agricultural  credit. By  the same  token,  microenterprises  in rural
areas,  which  account  for 43 percent  of the microenterprises  in the country,  should  also  be supported,  because  they  have  a
vital  role  in poverty  alleviation  and the diversification  of the economy.  More  importantly,  within  the group  of rural  poor,
womnen  are the marginalized  group  that needs specialized  financial  services. In addition  to serving  the credit  needs  of
these groups,  specialized  programs  would  help promote  overall  economic  growth  thrugh  diversification  of the rural
economy  and,  consequently,  risk  reduction  in rural  financial  intermediation.
How Much  Targeted  Credit?  An Illustration
How much credit would be needed to support these priority groups?  Total annual credit needed from
institutional  sources  to support  growth  was estimnated  in chapter 2 at Rs. 15.4.  billion (1993  Rs.) for the low-growth
scenario  and Rs. 69.8 billion  for  the high-growth  scenario. However,  only  a small  proportion  of the needed  credit  would
be policy  duected,  for  smallholders,  consumption  smoothing,  microenterprises,  and  women.
Sma11bolders:  Snallholders  operating  farms  of 10 acres  or less  contnbute  40 percent  of agricultural  GDP.  Assuming
constant  retums, their need  for agricultural  credit  to  support  a I percent  rate  of agricultural  growth  would  be the same  as
that of large  holders. It is also  assumed  that small  and large  farmers  have  the same  savings  rate of 5 percent  The
credit  need  for smallholders  is then calculated  to be 40 percent  of the total  credit  needed  to support  a I percent  rate  of46
agriultural growth  Thus,  the needed  policy-directed  agncultural  inveutment  credit  ranges  from  Rs. 4.2 billion  to  Rs. 24
billion  to support  agricultural  growth  ranging  from 4 to 8 percent  (table  4.1). The production  credit  need  of sma11 dm
is also  calculatd at 40 percent  of the production  credit  need for all farmers  , which yields  Rs. 2.0 billion  and Rs. 4.2
billion  respctively,  for the two  growth  scenanos. Thus,  total  agncultural  credit need  ranges  from Rs. 6.2 billion  to Rs.
28.1 billion. However,  the associated  budgetary  support  would  be quite small because  credit  would  not be lent at a
subsidized  lending  rate  but would  involve  higher  tranton  costs  to target  credit The subsidy  associated  with  the higher
transaction  costs  would  be around  10  percent of actual  lending  and would  range  from  Rs. 620  million  to  Rs. 2.8  bilion.
Table  4.1.  Smallholders  Annual  Need  for  Agricultural  Investment
(1993  Rs. Billion)
Alternative  Assumptions  of InvestmenVtAg.  GDP  Required
Agricltu  Growth  2 Percent  3 Percent
Rate
...............................................................................................................................................................................................................
4  4.2 billion  9.8 billion
6  9.8 billion  14.7 billion
8  15.4  billion  24.0 billion
................................................................................................  ...............................................................................................................
onsunmtion  smoothing. The need for consumption  credit, as projected  by respondents  in the 1985 rural credit
survey,  is estimated  to be 24 percent of total credit.  For simplicity,  it is assumed  that  this proportion holds for
institutional  credit as well. According  to the 1985 survey,  of the total rural credit needs 56 percent is needed  for
agricultural  purposes and 44 percent for nonagricultural  purposes. It is assumed  that these proportions  are the
same for poor rural households. The total annual rural credit needed  by poor rural households  for agricultural
purposes is thus estimated  at Rs. 11.1 billion (Rs 6.2 billionlO.  56) for the low-growth  scenario. The consumption
credit need of poor rural households  provided by institutional sources can be estimated as Rs. 2.7 billion (24
percent  of the total institutional  credit need)  under the low-growth  scenario. Under the high-growth  scenario,  farm
incomes  would  rise and the need  for consumption  credit would  decline.
Microenterprises.  The 1985  rural credit survey  projects  the credit need of rural enterprises  at 20 percent of the total
credit. Rural microenterprises'  need  for credit can be estimated  as Rs. 2.2 billion under the low-growth  scenario.
Under the high-growth  scenario, nonfarm business activities  are likely to increase, resulting in greater neod for
credit  finance.47
Women.  The 1991  Pakistan  intgrated  housedd mrvey  egimats nra  fmalmued  houedxii at 1.7  psooI of
houIeolds. This  figr  sems low, any  cawe  it iid  not corram rdect the  coustro  aof  wmen to houseid
income.  More  recet woiC 7 based  on the 1989  AERC/Wodd  Bank study  dirctly eimes  the cedibdm  of ibio
household  income  at 13.3  peraz  Extrapol&*g  from  this  gr, it is ammaed  that  1S  percent  of the  agrtual  GDP
(cmtywide) of the  poorest  40 peet  of nur hohods  ia  uitor  d by wome  Thus,  won  shoud  rceid at
lea  15  pc entof  theredit targeted  at  the  nual  poor  or  aboutRs.  1.7  billic
The  total  resources  noeded  fx targeted  nual acdit are  esimated  at Rs 12.8  billion  1  tmam  the  amou (b
15.5  billion)  these  instiutons a  ty lnd to agricltr  in their  untr_ed  p  gramL At  the 1993  lewI, the  1,n
of  Rs.  2.7  billion  wuld be available  to reire  bad  debt  and  make  the  insut  financly viabeir  tgd  kvAn
Table  4.2. Annual  PoLicy-Directed  Rura Credit  Neod  Under  Low-Gwt  e
(1993  Rs.  Billion)
Taret group  or  popose  Low  growh  scenio









teon  adations  for  the  Exiting  acal  ht_  oms
The  major  instimional  players  in nual  finance  are  the  commercial  bmn  the  coopeau  socies  and  bub,
and the Agricultual  Deveopme Bank  of Paksan (ADBP).  Due to vaiu  misrectd  poicy irnt  u_M theme
institutions  do not  operat efficientlyt  for  imprng  the  opertons of each  of then pmipa  ae made
below.
'Eshya  Mujabid-Mukhtar  and Noor-ul-Hassan  (1992). "Female  Participation  in Huehold Activities:  Some
Asseument  of the  Socio-econonuc  and Cultural  hnpact",  Pakistan  )c  gment  m  ie  (Winter).48
Pria  C  Bumal ng.
In addiuon  to  immavble property,  commercial  banks  can use  moveable  propertry  as collateal. There  is growing
enc that  p  l and less  singent  cterl  is e  yquall  deende,  for ample,  hypothaon  of gold  and  jewely
hypotheaion of cops and machuney,  and  pledgng of inventoes  and pesnal  guarntee.
Tie banks  may not rely  entirely  on the passbook  syslei, which  has  had a neglgible  imact on rmal lending.a  If
pasiooks are used as a fDrm  of guarantee  for bank loans,  a specia program  may have  to be initiated  for their speedier
Commcal  banks  have  to stictly folow SBP  regulations  credit  discipline,  adequac of provisons  for bad and
doubful debts,  and improvement  of debt-eqity ratios  Adherence  to these  polices will improve  finnci  security  and
help  promote  a better  credit  discipline.
Banks  must be  judged  both  on  the resources  they  mobiliz fm  nual areas  and on the resources  they channl to
the rural  sector. At preset the commcil  banks  nmbiliz much  more  resurs  from  rural  areas  than  they  lend  to these
arus  The baks  wmst  diversify  their lending porflios,  advance  loans for short-term  production  and long-Wem
vet  ent in both crop  and noncraop  production,  and encourage  imvestment  in agroprocessing  to support  agricutunal
moernization.  The commercial  banks  may  also  include  extension  services,  such  as linking  production  loans  with  use of
feilizers, pesticides,  irrigation,  and markeing  of  crops.
The commercial  banks  may  epeimet  with  wholealng credit  thrugh input suppliers  and mareting agents  as
well  as thugh  NGOs to reduce  the transtion  cost  of commercial  lending Such  a scheme woud bolster  lending  in the
nn  sector.
Successfl commercial  lending is, of course,  contingent  on prompt  and efctive  recovery  of loans.  Loan
recovey  requie  a transparent  systam  of property  rights  and effective  enforcement  of contracts.  The legal  procedures  for
loan reowery  from defauters should  be fast and effective.  The branch managers  should  have the authority  to recover
ovnu  as arrears  of land revenue.  The system  of lending  shoud be transparent  so that defaulters  of one  bank are not
rewarded  by another  bank. Without  a proper  and eflfctive  enforcement  mechanism  for recovery  of loans,  for example
though disposing  of land pledged  as collatral  few  conunmerci  banks  will be willing  to lend to large  riners  without
interveion from the Government Also,  it may be argued  that in the absence  of such a framework,  it is unlikely  that
oommercial  banks  will cater to the credit  needs  of large  farmers. The answer  lies  in improving  the legal framework  so
'Sixleen year.  after  this  systen was  intoducd,  ne peat  of amners  have  been  provided  passbooks,  which  constituted
about  37 percent  of  farm  loans.
9Acwrding  to one esimate, the commercial  banks  provide  only  12 percent  of the resources  they  mobilize  from rural
areas  on-lending  ( after  keeping  35  percent  as cash  reserves).49
that  work  on other  assets  of large  farmers  could  be effectively  used  as collateral.  Further  research  on measures  to improve
loan rament  behavior  would  be usefil.
Coopeaive Banks  and Societies
The coopertive sector is by far the largest network  in Pakistan,  but, as discussed  earlier, the cooperative
movement  has been subject  to abuse  by vested  interests  dominated  by large and affluent  farmers. The availability  of
finance  at subsidized  rates  has  sapped  the capacity  of the system  to mobilize  its own  resources  and  to build  up membership
on the basis of cooperative  principles.
The movement  must be revamped  and made subject  to the tests of profitability  and sustainability. Sevral
principles  are critical. First,  the general  principle  of the cooperative  movement  must be to promote  thrift  and savings  by
pooling  resources.  This  principle  is now  missing  and must  be the basis  of reorganizng  the cooperative  structure.  Second,
the movement  must be financally  viable.  The basic  building  block of the cooperative  movement  is the village-level
coperaie  societies,  which  are not  finanally viable.  The basic  societies,  should  be based  instead  on the Union  Councd
level.  Primary societies  would  ensure  a membership  of at least 500. But, given its size, it is better to have smaller
smcieties  based  on the village  which  are then federated  into the Union Council  cooperative  societies.  This would  allow
smaU  groups  to monitor  their  performance  and create  group  prssure to repay  the loan.
Third, the village-level  society  must  be responsible  for repayment  of loans  to individual  society  members.  If any
society  menber defaults  on a loan,  the entire  village  socety would  become  ineligible  for further  loans.  Similarly,  if any
member  fails  to repay the Union  Council-based  society,  the society  should  lose  its registration.  (A relevant  example  is the
Bangladesh  Rural Development  Board's  RD-12  project,  where members  of primary  societies  are organized  in smaUer
'solidarity  groups').
Fourth,  the village  cooperative  societies  must  be actmity-based.  They  are now agricultural  cooperative  societies.
The present structure  must be broadened  to include  the noncmp sector,  for example,  livestock,  fishery, and poultry.
People  involved  in nonagricultural  activities,  such  as microenterprises  as well  as ancllary services  such  as input  supplies,
procesing, marketing,  and storage  should  be allowed  to form oooperatves. Artisans,  tenants,  and landless  laborers
shnld  also  be allowed  to form their own  societies. Section  17 of the Cooperatve  Societies  Act must be amended  to
permit  these  changes.
Ffth, participation  in village  level  societies  must  be self-selective  so  that the small  groups  formed  at the village
level are homogenous.  Each village-level  socety meets  weekly  to collect  mandatory  deposits  and conduct  other  society
actvities. Union-level  meetings  are held  once  a month  to discuss  loan  proposals  and the performance  of the village-level
soaeties.  AU  transactions  at the union  level  must  be tansparent,  and no  vested  interest  should  be allowed  to  jeopardize  the
registration  of the societies.50
Sixth,  more  stringent  criteria  for  registration  of these  societies  should  be set  for minimu  membership,  deposits,
and share  capital.
Finally,  the societies  must  be allowed  determine  the cnteria  for  loan  eligibility,  loan  appraisal  procedures,  and set
loan  ceilings,  selection  of activity,  disbursement  and  loan recovery.
The cooperative  movement  also needs  to be restctured.  The cooperative  banks both at the provincial  and
federal  level need  to be reorganized  in order to make  them responsive  to member  needs.  They  must  be subject  to tigher
financial  discipline  and must improve  the quality  of mnagemnt  through  training staff greater  decentralization  and
auonomy, and improved  performance  incentives  at the individual  and insttutional levels. Currently,  the Provinc
Cooperative  Banks (PCBs) are simply acting as a credit disbursement  agency  of the Registrar of the Cooperatve
Department  For transparency  in financial  and admnistative matters  the Cooperative  Department  and the PCBs  must  be
separated.  The Cooperative  Department  should  concentrate  on its main functions  of registration,  regulation,  audit,  and
dissolution  The PCBs should  be headed  by professional  bankers  and  perform  the regular  banking functions  such as
authorization  and determination  of loans,  loan appraisal,  establishing  loan ceilings  by activity,  loan administration  and
follow-up,  and  loan  recoveries.
Both the PCBs  and the Federmi  Cooperative  Bank must raise  resources  from external  sources  for on-lending.
The currently  rely exclusively  on the State Bank of Pakistam  Currently,  they rely only the SBP funds. The Federal
Cooperative  Bank receives  credit  from the SBP  at 0.5 percent  and  passes  it on to the PCBs  at 3 percent The PCBs  charge
11 percent  to  society  members  with a margin  of 8 percent This  margin is large enough  for a bank  to  meet its cost  of
financial  intemiediation.  However,  due  to the low  loan recovery  rate, the cost  of intemediation  is high. The PCB  must
increase  the loan recovery  rate to reduce  the cost  of financial  intermediation.  Emphasis  should,  be on attaining  the long-
term  viability  of these  societies  and the cooperative  banks,  not on using  them  to  provide  cheap  credit  to society  members  .
Agricultural  Development  Bank of  Pakistan.
In 1993194  the ADBP  prvided the largest  percentage  of institutional  credit  to agriculture  (57  percent),  with 26
percent  given by commercial  banks and 17 percent  by cooperatives.  Most  ADBP  loans (56 percent)  are for long-tm
investmnt, which  has contnbuted  to agricultural  mechanization.  Although  the ADBP was designed  for smaliholders,
large  and medium  farmers  are the pnncipal  beneficiaries  of this  bank. Smallholders  receive  less  than 20 percent  of the
loans  disbursed  by  the ADBP,  while  over  60  percent  of its loans  go to  farmers  owning  more  than 12.5  acres However,  the
loan recvery rate is higher for  smallholders  (45 percent)  than for large farmers  (28 perent). As of April 1993,  42
percent  of the ADBP's  loan portfolio,  amounting  Rs. 2.9 billion,  were classified  as 'Sick". ADBP's  cost of financial
intrmediation has also  been  high  due  to poor  management  practices. Consequently,  the margin  between  interest  income
and  the cost  of  finanal  intermediation  has  been  negative  or zero  over  the years.51
The most important next step for ADBP is to carry out a thorough portfolio audit. A cucial  staring  point is in-
depth audit of its loan, equity and liquid asset portfolio,  covering not just the valuation and examination of the quality of
the assets but an assessment of the credit and portfolio magement  policies and practices which determine the quality of
the porifolio as wel  as an anlysis of the regulatory and supervisory  environments that influence the conduct of corporate
policies  and practices.
The portfolio audit is not intended to be a mere examination of the financial accounts, schedules  and statements
of ADBP although financial examination and audit techniques and  methods wil  necesrily  be employed to permut
analysis and pass judgement on the financial condition and performance  of the bank. Rather, the portfolio audit is meant
to be a comprehensive,  thorough and in-depth examination, analysis and assessment of the credit, portfolio management,
financial management and  risk management policies, operations and practices of the bank which directly bear on the
condition  and perfonmance  of its loan, equity and liquid assets.
The portfolio audit wil  provide an  analysis and  assessment of ten  areas of  ADBP's financil  policy and
operations:
a  a description and  an analysis of the performance, over 10 years,of the bank's  loan, equity and  liquid asset
portfolios  and the impact of the portfolio  perfornance  on the bank's overal financial condition and performance;
b.  an analysis and an assessment of the conduct  of the credit and investment  process and operations;
C.  an analysis and an assessment of the conduct of the portfolio supervision  and management function;
d.  an analysis and an assessment of the management  of the bank's credit, investment, liquidity,  interest rate anf
foreign exchange risks; and
e.  an analysis and an assessment of the bank's financing.
Based on the results of porlfolio  audit; next steps for ADBP will have to be worked out. If the organization is not
financially viable, drastic actions such as liquidation  and transferring  loans to collection agency will have to be considered.
If a major resruuctring  of the portfolio  (such as transferring bad loans to a collection  agency)  can lead to viability,  it should
liberalized from government control by selling shares to the pnvate sector.  The government share could be reduced over
time and private shareholders  (including farmers' representatives)  wil then fuUy  control its management. The new ADBP
would work under the State Bank of Pakistan's regulation  and supervision.52
Saliegd  Proziams  and  Institutions  for  Small  Size  Borrowm
The failue of comnercial  banks,  cooperative  banks,  and  the ADBP  in reaching  smaliolders,  the landless  poor,
and  odher  small  prods  in  ral areas  clearly  shows  that  ther  is a market  failure  in nrual  finance. The failure  is due
partly to high  ransaction  costs and partly to weakness  in program design.  The expenence  of Grameen  Bank in
Bangladesh,  and its replications  elsewhere,  clearly  shows  that it is possible  to serve poor and small  borrowers  on a
sustainable  basis.  However,  subsidized  funds are neoessary  not to sbsidize inte  st rates,  but to para  subsidize  the
coss of financial  intermediation  and institutional  development  It takes  about  five  years for a branch to function  on its
own.
The Grameen  Bank experience  shows  that targeted  credit  can alleviate  poverty  as well as increase  the human
and physical  capital  of the poor (see  box 3.1). Grameen  Bank started  with 60 percent  of equity  from the govemmenL
Over ime,  members  bought  shares,  reducing  the government  share  to 10  percent Although  outside  the govenmen  the
bank is subject  to regulation  and supervision  of the central  bank
Pakistan  has  been  considenng  a Grameen  Bank-type  institution  for smallholders  and the poor  in rural  areas  for
nore than six years. As a first step,  the govemment  could  test the model  in Pakistan  on pilot  basis. There  is cause  for
optumm because  group-based  lending  has proved  successfil  where  formal  maxkets  have failed. Such  a bank therefore
might  work well with smalflholders  and other  producers. Moreover,  such a group-based  bank can also be used as a
platform  for mcial  intriedton  and  agricultural  extension.
The GOP  might  also  create  a "Poverty  Alleviation  and Smallholders'  Development  Fund"  to provide  subsidized
funds not only  to the proposed  specialized  bank but also to NGOs,  commercial  banks, and the cooperative  banks  that
provide  financial  services  to the poor  and smallholders.  The  purpose  of these  subsidized  funds,  which  should  be provided
only  for a limited  tuie, will  develop  institutions  to provide  credit  to the targeted  group. Such  fund  thus would  provide  the
St-up  capital for many programs  to operate  on a competitive  basis, which would  otherwise  not be possible. The
ulimate borrower however,  will  pay  market  interest  rate.53
Appendix
Estimating Agricultural Savings
The three principal  forms of agricultural  savings  estimated  below  are self-financed  investments  in agriculture  bank
deposits held by the noncorporate  agricultural sector and currency holdings. The last  ten years have seen an
impressive  increase  in agricultural  investments  as measured  in private  fixed  capital formation. The series  reported
in column 2 of Table 1 is a slightly adjusted  version of the series reported  in government  statistics (Economic
Surveys,  various  years). It  assumes  that official  data underestimate actual capital  formation  by 10 percent due to
inadequate  coverage. The reported  series  reflects  this adjustment.  It shows  (figure 1) that fixed capital formation
hovered around 4 percent in  1974-80  and then increased  rapidly between 1981 and 1984.  In the last ten years
(1985-94)  the rate of fixed capital  formation in agriculture  has varied  between  6 and 8 percent  Direct evidence  on
purchase  of agricultural  machinery  and tubewells  corroborates  this trend.





1974  1976  1978  1980  1982  1984  1986  1988  1990  1992
1975  1977  1979  1981  1983  1985  1987  1989  1991  1993
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Table I  Investment  and Savings  in Aericulture
krawdnnmm  Advanoes  Deposis  Rupees  AGGDP  Owninvt  OVAUGDP  D/Aggdp  Rs /aggdp  Savings  Dep/Adv  AgtAGDP  OVAgI  ADV/AGDP  ADV/AgI  ^OVAgP
......  ........ i  ......... ~  .........................................................................................................................................................................................................................
1974  938.7  96  307  127.3  33633  842.7  2.51  0.92  0.38  3.81  3.2  2.8  0.9  0.29  10.23  89.77
1975  1496.8  1432  857  442.7  38338  64.8  0.17  2.24  1.15  3.56  0.6  3.9  0.04  3.74  95.67  4.33
1976  1776  878  544  554.8  43845  898  2.05  1.24  1.27  4.55  0.62  4.06  0.51  2  49.44  50.58
1977  2160.7  3  1423  529.5  50311  2157.7  4.29  2.83  1.05  8.17  4.29  1  0.01  0.14  99.86
1978  2291  665  867  1032.7  53915  1626  3.02  1.61  1.92  6.54  1.3  4.25  0.71  1.23  29.03  70.97
1979  2736.5  321  1009  741.8  62430  2415.5  3.87  1.62  1.19  6.67  3.14  4.38  0.88  0.51  11.73  88.27
1980  3060.4  325.9  1349.2  76399  2734.5  3.58  0  1.77  1.77  4.01  0.89  0.43  10.65  89.35
1981  5117.1  419.5  551  92216  4697.6  5.09  0  0.6  5.55  0.92  0.45  8.2  91.8
1982  6S28.9  -418.5  1542.2  99380  7047.4  7.09  0  1.55  6.67  1.06  -0.42  -6.31  106.31
1983  8168.5  1128.1  3191.2  1191.7  104550  7040.4  6.73  3.05  1.14  10.93  2.83  7.81  0.8W  1.08  13.81  86.19
1984  7967.7  2817.3  1304.8  837.5  121293  5150.4  4.25  1.08  0.69  6.01  0.46  6.57  0.65  2.32  35.36  64.64
1985  9036.5  4516.1  1917  1297.5  128801  4520.4  3.51  1.49  1.01  6.01  0.42  7.02  0.5  3.51  49.98  50.02
1986  10047.7  5891.1  5437.9  2171.1  135308  4156.6  3.07  4.02  1.6  8.7  0.92  7.43  0.41  4.35  58.63  41.37
1987  11183.3  8002.5  4457.7  2485.6  156357  3180.8  2.03  2.85  1.59  6.47  0.56  7.15  0.28  5.12  71.56  28.44
1988  12999.2  3469.9  2876.3  1847.4  184074  9529.3  5.18  1.56  1  7.74  0.83  7.06  0.73  1.89  26.69  73.31
1989  15463.4  5832.1  3195.9  3336.2  197441  9631.3  4.88  1.62  1.69  8.19  0.55  7.83  0.62  2.95  37.72  62.28
1990  16526.8  2691.2  1632.3  4161  233130  13835.6  5.93  0.7  1.78  8.42  0.61  7.09  0.84  1.15  16.28  83.72
1991  16462.4  1138.6  4352.6  2821.9  282374  15323.8  5.43  1.54  1  7.97  3.82  5.83  0.93  0.4  6.92  93.08
1992  18460.4  2908.8  6979.2  2858.6  297816  15551.6  5.22  2.34  0.96  8.53'  2.4  6.2  0.84  0.98  15.76  84.24
1993  19822.4  623.1  2251.3  3432.4  349592  19199.3  5.49  0.64  0.98  7.12  3.61  5.67  0.97  0.18  3.14  96.86
1.55
1974- 1980  565.83  834.50  2.65  1.74  1.16  5.55  1.77  3.95  0.67  1.30
1983- 1993  3547.16  3417.84  4.70  1.90  1.22  7.82  1.55  6.88  0.69  2.1855
Not all of the additional investment in agriculture can be attributed to higher savings.  Since the
late  1970s Pakistan's credit policy has substantially increased credit for agriculture.  This was achieved by
increasing lending targets of the nationalized commercial  banks, allocating greater credit to the  ADBP,
and  initiating lending at zero mark up.  Thus total bank advances to agriculture increased rapidly. Table I
shows that bank advances that had averaged Rs. 320 million per year in 1974-80 jumped to an average of
Rs. 3 billion per year in 1984-94.
Figure 2. The Structure of Investment  in Agriculture FIgue  2.The  1974-1981,  1984-1993
6
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Savings may also be held in the form of  bank deposits.  Direct evidence on rural bank deposits is
not available.  It is generally believed, however, that rural deposits constitute nearly  30 percent  of total
bank deposits.  The annual change in rural bank deposits,  reported in Table  l,  shows that savings in this
form have increased from an annual average of  Rs. 834.5 million in  1974-80 to Rs. 3.4 billion in 1984-94.
Currency  holdings  are  a  liquid  form  of  household  assets.  Year-to-year  changes  in currency
holdings give household savings in this asset form.  To calculate this form of savings, it is assumed that
rural households'  change  in currency holdings  are approximately 20 percent of  the change  in currency
holdings in the nonfinancial private sector.  As column 10 of Table I shows, savings in this Rs. 2.5 billion
on average per year.56
The structure of savings has changed in recent years (figure 3).  In  1974-80 capital formation  in
agriculture accounted for half the savings.  This share increased to 60 percent in 1981-94. The importance
of  deposits and currency holdings  has declined somewhat in recent years, but of the two, bank  deposits
remain the preferred saving mode.
The rural savings rate can be  calculated by adding the  three components of  rural savings and
dividing the total by the agricultural GDP (presented in column 12 of Table I and in figure 3).  The savings
rate averaged 7.8 percent in 1983-1993. compared with the average of  5.6 percent in 1974-80 (figure 3).
What accounts for this  increase in rural savings?  First,  rural  incomes have  increased in recent  years
because of improved prices as well as improved yields.  Second, the  flow of remittances into rural areas
(from family members working in the oil-rich countries of the Middle East) has increased the cash holdings
of rural households.  Third, land values have increased substantially in the last fifteen years, which  has
increased rural  wealth.  Finally, the  increased  availability  of  tractors  and  tubewells  has  reduced  the
uncertainty associated  with  farming  (by  reducing  the time  between  two  crops and  by  smoothing  out
availability of water), which has brightened prospects of returns to agricultural investments.
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